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JPRS-TAC-92-002

CONTENTS

14 January 1992

CHINA

U.S. Concerns Over Soviet Weapons Viewed [Hong Kong WEN WEI PO 18 Dec]	1
China Supports Korean Nuclear-Free Zone [XINHUA 19 Dec]	1
Paper Cites North Korea on Nuclear Accord [Zhou Bizhong; RENMIN RIBAO 24 Dec]	2
DPRK, ROK Sign Denuclearization Declaration	2
KCNA Cited [XINHUA 1 Jan]	2
Government Welcomes Accord [XINHUA 1 Jan]	2
XINHUA Reports U.S. Welcome [XINHUA 1 Jan]	3

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Welcomes South Korea's Nuclear-Free Announcement [KYODO 18 Dec]	4
Prime Minister Miyazawa Hails ROK N-Weapons Announcement [KYODO 19 Dec]	4

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Awaits U.S. Notification on Withdrawal [KCNA 17 Dec]	4
Daily Pushes for Denuclearization at Earliest Date [Pyongyang Radio 20 Dec]	4
Commentary on South's Announcement of N-Arms Removal [Chong Pong-kil; Pyongyang Radio 23 Dec]	6

SOUTH KOREA

No Tae-u Announcement on Nuclear-Free ROK [Seoul TV 18 Dec]	7
Political Parties Welcome No Tae-u Speech [YONHAP 18 Dec]	8
Plans To Sign International Convention Banning CW [YONHAP 30 Dec]	8

NEW ZEALAND

Committee To Assess Safety of Nuclear Ships [AFP 22 Dec]	9
--	---

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Bilateral CSBM Agreement With Turkey [BULGARSKA ARMIYA 23 Dec]	10
--	----

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Draft Plan Would Allow Soviet Troop Transit [CSTK 20 Dec]	11
---	----

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Obukhov Cited on Nuclear Disarmament Talks in U.S. [A. Surzhanskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 5 Dec]	12
---	----

START TALKS

'Drastic' Nuclear Arms Cuts Urged for Future [A. Arbatov; NEW TIMES 12-18 Nov]	12
--	----

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russian Defense Aide Urges ABM Cooperation With U.S. [V. V. Shlykov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 26 Oct]	14
Future of Aerospace Defense System Pondered [V. Prudnikov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Nov]	17

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Proposals at Vienna CSBM Talks Described [V. Smelov; TASS 4 Dec]	18
Estonian Foreign Minister Seeks UN Role Forcing Soviet Withdrawal	18
Calls For UN Troops [Moscow Radio 4 Dec]	18
Sees Continued Soviet Threat [Hamburg DPA 4 Dec]	18
Further on Disputes Over Soviet Pullout From Lithuania	19
Vilnius Claims Army Property [K. Uspila; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 4 Dec]	19
Deputy Premier Notes 'Signs' of Withdrawal [Vilnius Radio 7 Dec]	19
Landsbergis Seeks Aid To Speed Withdrawal [BALTFAX 12 Dec]	20
Lithuania Fears Soviet Army Trains Transiting From Germany [R. Jankauskas; Vilnius Radio 4 Dec]	21
Latvian Government Views Fate of Soviet Army Property [Riga Radio 5 Dec]	21
Latvian, Soviet Officials Discuss Withdrawal [T. Jundzis; Riga Radio 5 Dec]	21
Troop Withdrawal From Germany Status Reported [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Dec]	22
Progress in 'Open Skies' Talks Welcomed [V. Dmitriyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Dec]	22
Poll Reports Views on European Troop Withdrawal [INTERFAX 9 Dec]	23
Moldovan-Romanian Council Urges Soviet Troop Withdrawal [INTERFAX 9 Dec]	23
Troops To Withdraw From Baltics 'After 1994' [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Dec]	23

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakh President Confirms Nuclear Testing To End [Moscow Radio 5 Dec]	23
Scientist on Need for Nuclear Arms, Continued Testing [R. Ilkayev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Dec]	23

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

No Evidence of Laboratory Found Near Irkutsk [V. Khodiy; TASS 8 Dec]	27
More on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Investigation [A. Pashkov; IZVESTIYA 11 Dec]	27

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Envoy on Sino-Soviet Border Troop Reduction Talks	29
Results of Fifth Round [Moscow Radio 4 dec]	29
Says Talks 'Businesslike' [Moscow Radio 5 Dec]	29

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Russian Officials Comment on Nuclear Weapons Plans	30
Nuclear Sufficiency Envisaged [G. Batenin; INTERFAX 3 Dec]	30
'Legal Succession' in Control [A. Kozyrev; INTERFAX 9 Dec]	30
Officers Say No Nuclear Arms at Estonian Garrison [BALTFAX 5 Dec]	30
Ukraine's Kravchuk on Nuclear Weapons Policies	30
To Be Non-Nuclear State [Kiev Radio 6 Dec]	30
Discusses New Missile Command System [TASS 9 Dec]	31
U.S. Sources on Nuclear Weapons Control Cited [TASS 9 Dec]	31
Canada 'Anxious' About Soviet Nuclear Arms [V. Vasilets; TASS 9 Dec]	31
Observer Views Control of Nuclear Weapons [V. Solovyev; Moscow Radio 9 Dec]	31
Experts Comment on Nuclear Arsenal Security [TASS 11 Dec]	32
Disintegration of Nuclear Power Viewed [A. Gerasimov; Moscow TV 11 Dec]	32
Belarusan Defense Chief: No Hurry Over Nuclear Arms [TASS 11 Dec]	33
Kazakh Defense Official Favors Single Command [TASS 11 Dec]	33
Air Force Chief Reassures Germans on Central Control [R. Moniac; Hamburg DIE WELT 12 Dec]	33

Nuclear Treaties To Apply to All Republics	[L. Yermakova; TASS 12 Dec]	34
Primakov Insists Nuclear Weapons 'Secure'	[L. Cidylo; TASS 12 Dec]	34
Control of Nuclear Arms 'Not Clear' to West	[G. Deynichenko; IZVESTIYA 12 Dec]	35

WEST EUROPE

GERMANY

Conditions Set for Destruction of Tanks Under CFE		
[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 18 Dec]		36
Genscher Calls on NATO for 'Salvation' of CFE Treaty		
[FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 20 Dec]		36
Genscher Announces Deposition of CFE Ratification Document	[ADN 23 Dec]	36
Soviet Army Forces Fulfill 1991 Withdrawal Plan	[DPA 27 Dec]	37

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Office Aide Warns NATO on Soviet Missiles		
[G. Meade; PRESS ASSOCIATION 19 Dec]		37

U.S. Concerns Over Soviet Weapons Viewed

HK1812064391 Hong Kong WEN WEI PO in Chinese
18 Dec 91 p 2

[Editorial: "Soviet Nuclear Weapons Are Headache for United States"]

[Text] It is believed that Baker's visit to Moscow will focus on the Soviet Union's control over its nuclear weapons.

Bush already had telephone conversations with Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and both guaranteed that the nuclear weapons will be under unified control. Other republics which also possess nuclear weapons have made similar statements.

The security of the Soviet Union's 27,000 nuclear warheads was not a problem when the Soviet Union was a unified nation. As long as the right to transfer and launch nuclear weapons is within strict control of the Soviet Central Government, nobody can approach the nuclear arsenal. Following Baker's statement that "the Soviet Union no longer exists," however, the United States had to consider the seriousness of the situation in the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev discovered that he could not exercise control over the troops and the country's development and that he could not even ensure his position as president, it meant that anything could happen. Any political leader's promises will be far from what is actually implemented.

The presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have given open assurances on the security of the nuclear weapons, and this seems to have reassured Baker. This reveals, however, that Gorbachev's promises are not going to be honored and that these people are the figures who have real powers and the right to speak on nuclear security. Yeltsin has even said publicly: "Gorbachev cannot play any role in the new commonwealth, so he will resign within a month." The state of "five heads in a nation" reflects the volatility and unpredictability of the Soviet situation.

In the past, the United States has only been in contact with the central Soviet Government in its effort to seek nuclear security. Baker's current itinerary includes the four republics that possess nuclear weapons. He had to haggle with them over the issue, thus increasing the difficulties in the control over nuclear weapons. Beginning in October, all the four republics asked for a share of their control over nuclear weapons. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have been worried that Russia would dominate the other republics if it controlled the nuclear weapons. They also consider the nuclear weapons stored in their republics as bargaining chips to use when negotiating with the Western powers for more economic aid. The Ukrainian Parliament decided to establish its independent navy, ground, and air forces and has tried to propose an amendment bill on exercising control over the nuclear weapons stored within the republic. The

parliament leader has said: "Ukraine does not intend to use nuclear weapons; rather, it wants to seek ways to destroy them."

Talks are necessary to destroy nuclear weapons, and possession of nuclear weapons is taken as the admission ticket to the talks. For this reason, Baker will visit the capitals of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan and will meet with the republican leaders to find out the real status of the Soviet Union's disintegration as well as the speed and trend of future development.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Central Government can no longer control the situation, the United States has made arrangements, delivering emergency aid materials by air to Belarus, Russia, and Armenia. In other words, the materials are directly delivered to the republics rather than distributed by the Soviet Central Government. Nevertheless, this U.S. move runs counter to its original purpose. The United States wants the Soviet Union to keep a unified Army, but the direct aid it has given to the republics has aggravated the Soviet Union's disintegration, undermining the foundation of a unified Army.

What is the essential factor for keeping a unified Army? The rudimentary condition is that the central government should still exist and be capable of offering provisions and funds to the troops. When the central government's pocket is empty, and the United States no longer offers aid to the government, the troops will have no choice but to depend on the republics for funds. Whoever can pay the military expenses owns the troops. If the republics can pay part of the military expenses, they will be able to have their own troops. Moreover, the troops will have to "serve their masters." As for the republics which are beset with economic difficulties, they will be driven to the wall and even secretly export their nuclear technology and personnel. Now the military scientists receive a salary of only 750 rubles. They will have to seek a way out by themselves for their future employment. When the nuclear technology is regarded as a commodity for making a living and when these nuclear scientists are employed by some countries with handsome remuneration, it will turn into a grave consequence.

It is definite that Baker will get many promises and large numbers of guarantee documents during his Soviet trip. The more promises the United States gets, the more complicated the implementation of nuclear nonproliferation will be.

China Supports Korean Nuclear-Free Zone

OW1912100391 Beijing XINHUA in English
0951 GMT 19 Dec 91

[Text] Beijing, December 19 (XINHUA)—China has always supported the proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

In response to a correspondent's question on South Korean President No Tae-u's recent announcement, Spokesman Wu Jianmin said that it was reported that on December 18 the South Korean side announced that South Korea no longer stockpiles any nuclear weapons. The U.S. side also stated that it was ready to accept inspection of its installations in South Korea so as to testify that there are no nuclear weapons there.

"We have taken note of the above-mentioned announcement and statement and hold that they deserve welcome," Wu said at a weekly press conference.

China has always supported the proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, and hopes that the above announcement and statement will be conducive to the achievement of such a goal, he added.

Paper Cites North Korea on Nuclear Accord

*HK3012090991 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
24 Dec 91 p 6*

[Dispatch by reporter Zhou Bizhong (0719 1801 1813): "North Korean Foreign Ministry Spokesman Says North Korea Will Sign Nuclear Safeguards Accord"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 23 Dec (RENMIN RIBAO)—On 22 December, the [North] Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman made a statement here that it would sign the nuclear safeguards accord and accept inspection through the relevant procedures.

The statement says: South Korea declared on 18 November that it no longer had nuclear weapons. If all U.S. nuclear weapons have been pulled out from South Korea, [North] Korea welcomes this.

The statement says that, although the United States has not given any official notification or notice regarding the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, North Korea believes that the United States will show its position in the future, and that on this premise, North Korea will sign the nuclear safeguards accord and accept inspection through the relevant procedures.

The statement reiterates that, as North Korea accepts inspection, it should, at the same time, carry out inspections in South Korea to ensure that the nuclear weapons installed in South Korea have already been withdrawn.

The statement stresses that in regard to simultaneous inspection, Korea and the United States must hold negotiations on questions relating to it and on the question of eliminating nuclear threats. The statement also calls on North and South Korea to sign at the earliest possible date the declaration making the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

DPRK, ROK Sign Denuclearization Declaration

KCNA Cited

*OW0101115092 Beijing XINHUA in English
0739 GMT 1 Jan 92*

[Text] Pyongyang, January 1 (XINHUA)—A "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" (Draft) was initialed when delegates from the North and the South met in their third contact in the truce village of Panmunjom Tuesday, according to the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA).

However, KCNA did not disclose details of the declaration.

At the end of the contact a joint report agreed upon by the sides was published, which include:

The North and the South shall see to it that "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" comes into effect at the sixth inter-Korean high-level talks on February 19, 1992 through necessary procedures;

The North and the South shall exchange the texts of "Joint Declaration" signed respectively by the premiers of both sides at Panmunjom twice, on January 14 and 21, 1992, as a prior step to this end;

The North and the South agreed that "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" might be amended and supplemented upon agreement between the sides.

Delegates from the two sides of the divided nation began their contacts on December 26.

Government Welcomes Accord

*OW0101061192 Beijing XINHUA in English
0600 GMT 1 Jan 92*

[Text] Beijing, January 1 (XINHUA)—China welcomed the initialing of a joint declaration on the denuclearization in the Korean peninsula by North and South Korea, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

Responding to a question on this matter, the spokesman said that representatives of North and South Korea have initialed the joint declaration on the denuclearization in the Korean peninsula through negotiations. This is the result of the joint efforts of both North and South Korea.

"We welcome this development. It is our hope that the objective of the denuclearization in the Korean peninsula will be realized at an early date," he added.

XINHUA Reports U.S. Welcome

*OW0101162992 Beijing XINHUA in English
1539 GMT 01 Jan 92*

[Text] Washington, January 1 (XINHUA)—The U.S. administration has expressed welcome to the inter-Korean agreement banning nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.

In a statement released on Tuesday, the State Department said the two sides of Korea "have undertaken to renounce nuclear weapons, to renounce the possession of reprocessing and enrichment facilities and to set up systems of inspections for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula."

"We welcome this development," the department said. "It demonstrates the primary importance of North-South dialogue as a means of resolving tensions on the Korean peninsula."

The two parts of Korea yesterday initialed an agreement at Panmunjom, under which, they will not test, manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.

They also agreed to set up their own reciprocal verification system. The agreement takes effect after formal adoption in February.

However, South Korean officials said that South Korea will continue to remain under U.S. nuclear umbrella protection and will allow U.S. planes and ships carrying nuclear weapons to fly over or make port calls.

JAPAN

Foreign Minister Welcomes South Korea's Nuclear-Free Announcement*OW1812120391 Tokyo KYODO in English 1151 GMT 18 Dec 91*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 18 KYODO—Japan's Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe Wednesday welcomed South Korean President No Tae-u's announcement confirming South Korea nuclear-free.

Watanabe said in a written statement that Japan strongly urges the denuclearization of North Korea and also their acceptance of international inspection of their existing nuclear facilities.

He called on North Korea to sign and carry out accords with the International Atomic Energy Agency as soon as possible and shut down its nuclear processing facilities so as to clear away concerns held by the international community on nuclear development in North Korea.

He also said he expects progress in inter-Korean discussions on nuclear issues scheduled to be held in Panmunjom later in December.

Prime Minister Miyazawa Hails ROK N-Weapons Announcement*OW1912032891 Tokyo KYODO in English 0259 GMT 19 Dec 91*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 19 KYODO—Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa on Thursday welcomed South Korea's declaration that the country was free of nuclear weapons as "quite significant," and urged North Korea to follow through on its pledge to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

"The next step will be for North Korea to keep its promise," Miyazawa told reporters at his official residence.

South Korean President No Tae-u said Wednesday that no nuclear weapons exist anywhere in South Korea, apparently confirming the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the country.

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Awaits U.S. Notification on Withdrawal*SK1712045391 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0423 GMT 17 Dec 91*

["DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman Interviewed"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang December 17 (KCNA)—A reporter of the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) today asked the spokesman of the DPRK Foreign Ministry if it is true

that we were notified of the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea as claimed by some press reports.

The spokesman answered:

Some news agencies reported that we were notified of the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

To tell the truth, nobody has officially notified us of the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

We have only read some distorted news reports.

We are waiting for a notification from the U.S. Administration so that we can believe that the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea has really started.

Daily Pushes for Denuclearization at Earliest Date*SK2612011891 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0017 GMT 20 Dec 91*

[NODONG SINMUN 20 December special article: "Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Is an Imminent Task That Cannot Be Delayed"]

[Text] The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: To eliminate the danger of nuclear war in Korea and to ensure peace there, it is imperative to withdraw U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea, to realize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and to solve the reunification question of Korea peacefully.

The peace-loving people of the world who want to live in a peaceful world devoid of nuclear weapons are now vigorously waging the movement to establish nuclear-free zones on an international scale. Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone should be realized at the earliest possible date and has become a mature demand [songsuktoen yogu] in the general trend of the times. This is because it is not only an important matter affecting the Korean people's destiny but is also a serious matter for Asia's peace and security.

Our Republic, regarding the removal of the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula as the vital matter affecting the nation's destiny and existence and as an important key to achieving the cause of global peace, has actively made consistent efforts to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone.

That we positively advanced a proposal to settle the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone at the fifth round of North-South high-level talks is clear proof of this. The declaration on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone that we proposed contains all practical articles for guaranteeing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including having the North and the South make joint efforts to withdraw

U.S. forces and nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and to abolish nuclear bases, jointly verifying the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and the abolition of U.S. nuclear bases, and implementing the duty of a simultaneous nuclear inspection as required by international treaty.

This proposal is a constructive and reasonable one which would make it possible to solve the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula in the most fair and aboveboard way, to lead our nation out of the danger of nuclear calamity, and to most thoroughly ensure the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Last July, too, we advanced a proposal containing detailed measures for the solution of the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula. Some time ago, in a statement by our Foreign Ministry, we clarified that we will sign the nuclear safeguards agreement when the United States begins to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea and that an inspection of our nuclear facilities can be made simultaneously with an inspection for verifying whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons are present.

This clearly shows our Republic's consistent and just stance and sincere efforts on the issue on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. It is only too natural that such a stance and such efforts have won support and sympathy from domestic and international public opinion and in the international community.

The South Korean authorities, who not only had kept silent about the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone but had also gone so far as to take the attitude of opposing it, expressed their will on the nuclear issue, aside from their intent and purpose. Also, the South side, sharing with us the understanding that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, has agreed to hold a contact of delegates to discuss and settle the nuclear issue.

These are the demonstrations of the will to settle the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone with the independent strength of the nation; these constitute a one step advance. If and when the North and the South make joint efforts, a favorable phase for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone can be provided.

All of the Korean people want the Korean peninsula to be turned into a nuclear-free zone at the earliest possible date. Numerous Asian and world people who love peace demand that the Korean peninsula be turned into a nuclear-free zone. Whether the Korean peninsula will be turned into a nuclear-free zone or not depends entirely on the United States' attitude.

Today the United States no longer opposes or turn away from the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. As U.S. authorities themselves say, the East-West cold war system is collapsing at the present time, and the nuclear confrontation between the nuclear superpowers, which were of hostile relations, is being alleviated.

The United States, declaring the Korean peninsula a test site for the confrontation of force between the West and the East, has clamored that its policy of turning South Korea into a nuclear base and the forward deployment of its nuclear armed forces is to check the Soviet Union. However, today when the two countries of the Soviet Union and the United States do not regard each other as the enemy and are talking about the need for nuclear disarmament, there is no justification whatsoever for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea and to continue to hold on to it as a nuclear base.

Furthermore, recently the United States has admitted the presence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and gone so far as to express its will to withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea. The international community is paying attention to a series of such changes in the U.S. attitude and hopes that the U.S. will not become an empty pledge and will be converted into a practical act at the earliest possible date.

The source of the nuclear issue in our country was originally the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. Therefore, withdrawing U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea has become a key factor for resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, that is, the issue of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

South Korea is a nuclear powderkeg, the largest in the world. More than 1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been deployed there, and they are ready to be used at any time. The United States is attempting to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against our Republic, using as a stepping-stone South Korea, a colony and a military base, which it regards as a military stronghold and as a most favorable region for the use of nuclear weapons.

Recently, advertising someone's nuclear development and nuclear threat and making such violent utterances as choice of a strong military action and bombing of strategic points in a bid to check and frustrate the fabricated nuclear development and nuclear threat the U.S. ruling circles are more frantically running wild for a war commotion. Talking about military pressure on someone and the renouncing of its development of nuclear weapons, the U.S. ruling circles are planning to stage next year's Team Spirit joint military exercise on a larger scale.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is being aggravated with each passing day, and this is affecting the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world. Only by turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone can we remove the nuclear flash point, the most dangerous one in the world, and prevent a nuclear war.

What attitude they will take toward turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone becomes a yardstick which distinguishes whether they want war or peace. If the United States truly wants peace on the Korean peninsula and in Asia and the world, it should show this through practical acts to turn the Korean peninsula into

a nuclear-free zone. Only by doing so can the Korean peninsula become a nuclear-free zone and, thus, a favorable phase for building a nuclear-free world be opened.

Commentary on South's Announcement of N-Arms Removal

*SK2412022191 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 1150 GMT 23 Dec 91*

[Commentary by station commentator Chong Pong-kil: "Nuclear Inspection Should Be Conducted Simultaneously"]

[Text] As was already reported, on 22 December, a spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry released a statement in connection with the announcement of the South Korean person of authority that there is not a single nuclear weapon in South Korea, which was made public on 18 December concerning the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

The spokesman stated that if it is true that U.S. nuclear weapons have been completely withdrawn from South Korea and that nuclear weapons no longer exist there, as the South Korean person of authority announced, Pyongyang welcomes this, because it would mean that our invariable legitimate demand has been met at last. The spokesman clarified that we will sign the safeguard accord under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and will go through the inspection according to relevant procedures. He also elucidated the essential issues in connection with this.

The spokesman's statement again demonstrates the legitimacy of the consistent policy stated by our party and the government of the Republic for the peaceful solution of the acute nuclear issue. This has opened a new bright prospect for ensuring peace in Asia and in the world.

As everyone knows, the issue of nuclear weapons has been raised acutely on the Korean peninsula because of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. This issue has become more grave recently, because the U.S. imperialists enforced a unilateral nuclear inspection while raving about our nonexistent nuclear development.

We have already maintained that we have neither the intention nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons and that the nuclear inspection, if it is to be conducted, should be simultaneously conducted not only of us, who have no nuclear weapons, but also of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea.

If the United States had not dragged the nuclear weapons into South Korea from the outset, the nuclear issue would not even have been raised, and if the United States had accepted our legitimate demand for withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and for simultaneous inspection, the issue of nuclear weapons would have been smoothly resolved a long time ago.

After the United States declared that it would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, the South Korean person of authority recently announced that there is not a single nuclear weapon in South Korea. If it is true that U.S. nuclear weapons have been completely withdrawn from South Korea and that nuclear weapons no longer exist in the land of South Korea, this would be a fruition of the persistent and patient efforts consistently made by our party and the government of the Republic and a great victory for our nation, which waged a resolute struggle for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and the removal of the danger of nuclear war.

The United States has not made any official notification nor has it released an announcement up to now concerning the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons. However, since the announcement that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea was released, we will sign the nuclear safeguards accord and go through the nuclear inspection, on the premise that the United States will make its stand clear in the future.

This is a clear expression of our consistent peaceloving position and attitude to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations.

Since the announcement was released that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea and through our plan to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and to receive the inspection, the peaceful road for resolving the nuclear issue has been opened and the condition is mature for the North and the South to immediately and jointly adopt a declaration for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

However, after hearing only the words of the South Korean person of authority, who has no rights over the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, one cannot properly understand the presence or absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea. It is the United States which deployed the nuclear weapons in South Korea and which has the right to use and withdraw them. Therefore, in the event that we go through the inspection according to the nuclear safeguards accord, an inspection should be made simultaneously to verify and confirm the presence or absence of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, as we have already called for this and the South Korean side, too, has responded to it.

For this, negotiations between us and the United States, the master of nuclear weapons, should be realized to discuss relevant issues and the issue of removal of nuclear threat.

The United States should affirmatively respond to our just and fair proposal.

SOUTH KOREA

No Tae-u Announcement on Nuclear-Free ROK

SK1812115191 Seoul KBS-1 Television Network
in Korean 1000 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Announcement by ROK President No Tae-u from Chongwadae, Seoul—live]

[Text] My fellow Koreans,

Last week, South and North Korea agreed on a detailed accord in an effort to end the half-century old cold war on the Korean peninsula and to open a new era of peace.

The accord, which was signed at the conclusion of the fifth South-North high-level talks, consists of important measures that are necessary to end national division and rivalry on the basis of mutual trust, to build a structure of peace on our land, and to promote national reconciliation and common prosperity through exchanges and cooperation.

The Republic of Korea has pursued this accord, for we believe that the development of an inter-Korean relationship based on peaceful coexistence and common prosperity is an essential step towards the goal of national unification.

Together with the parallel entry of South and North Korea into the United Nations in September, the signing of the South-North Korea accord last week is an epic milestone on our road to the resolution of the Korean question and the attainment of national unity.

South and North Korea should now march together toward peace and unification.

The tasks and courses of action which lie ahead of the two Koreas are clear.

It is now incumbent on the two Korean Governments to implement faithfully the contents of the accord step by step so that national reconciliation, peace, and common prosperity, which are aspirations shared by all Koreans, may soon be realized.

The Republic of Korea pledges to do its utmost in transforming the relationship with the North from one of rivalry to partnership, exchanges, and cooperation. In addition, we will seek a speedy resolution of political and military issues between South and North Korea.

The cold war brought upon our nation untold sorrows and tragedies. The sacrifices and tribulations this nation suffered from division, war, and rivalry have been truly enormous and unbearable.

Now, the two Koreas have produced a charter of peace that will end the dark period in their history and bring forth a new era of reconciliation and cooperation. I firmly believe that this charter will mark a momentous

turning-point on the road to building a new nation in which 70 million Koreans together shall forge a glorious future.

Fellow Koreans,

Before we proceed with the implementation of the widely supported inter-Korean accord, however, there is an important issue that must be resolved at the earliest possible date. It is the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

On 8 November, I enunciated the non-nuclear Korean peninsula peace initiative, noting that the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea was an extremely dangerous venture which posed serious threats not only to the peace and survival of the Korean people, but also to regional and global stability.

It was for these reasons that I made a public pledge specifically declaring that South Korea would not manufacture, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons, and that we would also renounce the right to build nuclear reprocessing facilities, which could very well have been justified on grounds of economic necessity.

In order to remove any obstacles to nuclear inspections of North Korea, the government, in consultation with the U.S. Government, proposed during the recent high-level talks to conduct simultaneous nuclear inspections of facilities in the South, including the U.S. military bases in South Korea.

To submit military bases of a nuclear superpower to international inspection is a truly exceptional precedent, but we have reached this decision for the sole purpose of a peaceful and smooth resolution of the Korean peninsula nuclear issue.

It is gratifying to note that last week at the high-level talks South and North Korea jointly recognized that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. On this common ground, I sincerely hope that a definitive agreement on nuclear issues will emerge from the Panmunjom working-level conference later this month.

So that we may come to an early resolution of the nuclear issue, I take this opportunity to make one thing emphatically and unequivocally clear to you, my fellow Koreans, as well as to North Korea and the world at large:

As I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea.

Clearly, then, the non-nuclear policy enunciated in my 8 November declaration has now been fulfilled insofar as the Republic of Korea is concerned.

My fellow Koreans,

I would like to emphasize the following to the North Korean authorities:

Since the Republic of Korea is now completely nuclear-free and since we have agreed to the simultaneous nuclear inspections proposal, there is no reason or excuse for North Korea to develop nuclear weapons or refuse nuclear inspection.

North Korea must forthwith conclude and ratify a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, shut down all nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities, and submit unconditionally to international inspection.

It is now North Korea's responsibility to demonstrate to the Korean people and the world that a genuine peace is indeed emerging on the Korean peninsula, by resolving the nuclear issue on the basis of the letter and spirit of the South-North accord at an early date.

Obviously, we cannot successfully build peace and national reconciliation without first resolving the nuclear question. For this reason, the entire international community is currently searching for ways to deter North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, having recognized it to be a significant threat to the peace of this region and potentially a grave danger in fueling the proliferation of nuclear weapons globally.

I believe that the North Korean authorities are well aware of the central issues. I would expect that North Korea will bring to the forthcoming Panmunjom conference measures that will satisfy the legitimate demands of the Korean people and the international community.

[Seoul YONHAP in English at 0906 GMT on 18 December, in its transmission of the "English-language text" of No's announcement, here adds the following paragraph]:

North Korea must immediately abandon the development of nuclear weapons. It is an imperative duty that cannot and should not be delayed.

I sincerely hope that an agreement guaranteeing a nuclear-free Korean peninsula will emerge by the end of this month so that with the new year the two Koreas will usher in a new era of reconciliation, cooperation, peace and common prosperity.

Thank you.

Political Parties Welcome No Tae-u Speech

SK1812124991 Seoul YONHAP in English 1236 GMT 18 Dec 91

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 18 (YONHAP)—The ruling and opposition parties have welcomed President No Tae-u's special statement Wednesday on absence of nuclear weapons in South Korea and in unison called on North Korea to make commensurate efforts aimed at a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.

Spokesman Pak Hui-tae of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party said in a statement, "We take the declaration as a

cornerstone for the settlement of peace in Northeast Asia and reunification of South and North Korea." He said that North Korea should on its part make commensurate measures to eradicate nuclear weapons such as acceptance of nuclear inspection and abolition of nuclear reprocessing facilities."

Pak U-sop, deputy spokesman for the opposition Democratic Party, issued a statement in which he said, "We rejoice over the speech together with 70 million compatriots. North Korea should unconditionally accept nuclear inspection and renounce nuclear arms development program."

Plans To Sign International Convention Banning CW

SK3012114891 Seoul YONHAP in English 1129 GMT 30 Dec 91

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 30 (YONHAP)—The South Korean Government has decided to sign an international convention on prohibiting chemical weapons [CW] as soon as it is concluded in the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD), government sources said Monday.

The government, the sources said, recently convened a meeting of relevant officials from the Foreign, Defense, Trade-Industry and Science-Technology Ministries and the Agency for National Security Planning and decided to make laws and draw up administrative measures necessary for fulfilling the terms of the convention.

The meeting discussed measures to minimize the impact the nation's signing of the convention would have on the domestic industries.

The pact, which is widely expected to be concluded next year, is likely to oblige all signatories to file reports on all chemical weaponry, its manufacturing facilities and related research institutes in their possession within 30 days of signing it and start to dismantle them the following year for a complete abolition in 10 years, or by 2002.

The convention is expected to spell out strict restrictions on the use and trade of chemical substances normally needed for manufacturing chemical weapons, sources said.

The government has decided to provide domestic chemical businesses with lists of chemical substances of which use or trade is feared to be banned by the envisaged accord.

President No Tae-u, when announcing on Nov. 8 a proposal for a non-nuclear Korea, made clear that South Korea would join in international endeavors to eradicate biochemical weapons.

NEW ZEALAND

Committee To Assess Safety of Nuclear Ships

*BK2312003291 Hong Kong AFP in English 2351 GMT
22 Dec 91*

[Text] Wellington, Dec 23 (AFP)—The New Zealand Government announced Monday it would create a four-member committee under the chairmanship of a retired judge to report on the safety of nuclear-powered ships.

Prime Minister Jim Bolger said in a statement the government wanted an independent and scientific assessment of safety, environmental and other concerns that would arise if nuclear-powered ships entered New Zealand ports.

Bolger said he would set up the committee after President George Bush announced in September that U.S. surface warships would no longer carry nuclear weapons.

That decision opened the way for resumed warship visits to New Zealand, which ended in 1985 with the introduction of anti-nuclear legislation.

The United States responded by ending defence and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand, and the National Party government has been striving to normalise relations since it came to power in October last year.

The outstanding problem is that anti-nuclear laws also ban nuclear-powered vessels from New Zealand ports. The government is considering amending the legislation but first wants an assessment of the risk factor.

The committee will begin work in January and report to the government by the middle of next year.

The chairman of the committee is retired Appeal Court Judge Sir Edward Somers. Its members are physics professor Alan Poletti, zoology professor Patricia Bergquist and civil engineering professor David Elms.

They are all New Zealanders.

BULGARIA**Bilateral CSBM Agreement With Turkey**

*AU0201085392 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 23 Dec 91 p 4*

["Sofia Document on Mutually Supplementing Confidence- and Security-Building Measures [CSBM] and Military Contacts Between Bulgaria and Turkey"]

[Text] The chiefs of General Staff of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Turkey, two states-participants in the CSCE, met in Sofia from 16-20 December 1991.

Recalling their countries' obligations ensuing from the Helsinki Final Act, the Document from the Stockholm Conference, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, the Joint Paris Declaration, and the 1990 Vienna Document;

Expressing once again their conviction that efforts on a bilateral and multilateral basis must be aimed at the further development of the CSCE—a process in which all constituent parts together represent a complete whole;

Bearing in mind the importance of military openness and contacts, which incidentally were also furthered by the seminars on military doctrines conducted in Vienna within the CSCE framework;

Aiming at making a positive contribution to strengthening security and confidence in the Balkans and in Europe through their bilateral efforts;

Recognizing that the contribution of all other states from the region will be especially beneficial in strengthening the security and confidence in the Balkans;

Affirming their intention not to violate the military interests of a third country at any stage;

Recalling that they retain their rights either to be or not to be participants in agreements and unions;

Noting that their rights and obligations in accordance with previous legal or political commitments will not be compromised;

They decided to make a start at a bilateral process, that is aimed at strengthening confidence and security in the region on the basis of dialogue and cooperation, that will be implemented in stages and concentrate their efforts in the following areas:

The further strengthening of confidence and security along the Turkish-Bulgarian border and improving the exchange of military information;

The expanding of military contacts.

In accordance with the above the following was adopted:

II. Measures for Strengthening Confidence and Security and Improving the Exchange of Military Information To Be Implemented in a Specific Zone of Application Along the Turkish-Bulgarian Border

1. The two countries will give each other advance notice of military activities to be conducted by them on their respective territories within the borders of the following zone of application, stretching from Burgas, Straldzha, Boyadzhik, Rogozinovo, Shtit, Buyukdyolyuk [name as published], Turgutbey [name as published], Tozaklu [name as published], and Kiyikoy.

2. Military activities will be the subject of notification whenever they include: At least 10,000 personnel; at least 250 combat tanks; or at least 200 artillery guns with a 100-mm caliber or more; if the troops are organized in divisions or at least in two brigades/regiments that are not necessarily under the command of the same division.

3. Each side will invite observers from the other side when military activities are conducted that are liable for notification. The activities mentioned above will be the subject of observation when the number of troops taking part number or exceed 12,000; or the number of combat tanks is equal to or more than 300; or the number of artillery guns with 100-mm caliber or more is equal to or exceeds 250.

4. The two countries will not conduct military exercises on the level of regiment or higher in the regions lying along their borders within 15 kilometers of the zone of application as defined in Paragraph 1 above.

5. Each side will give each other written notification, using diplomatic channels, as soon as possible but no later than 42 days before the beginning of military activities liable to notification in the zone of application defined in Paragraph 1 above.

6. Each side has the right to conduct an inspection and two visits for assessment on the territory of the other side in the zone of application defined in Paragraph 1 above, in addition to those envisaged in the 1990 Vienna Document.

7. Each side will refrain from conducting additional inspections and/or visits for assessment when inspections and/or visits for assessment are being conducted there by a third country.

8. Each side will set up a 24-hour continuous liaison post in their respective General Staff that safeguards the transmission and receipt of communications relating to the above stated measures around the clock.

9. The notification and format of their contents, the length of actions of these and other conditions relating to the observations, additional inspections, and visits for assessment will be subject to the respective conditions and procedures laid down in the 1990 Vienna Document.

II. Military Contacts

10. To increase openness and transparency through the expansion of military contacts within the framework of the 1990 Vienna Document, the two sides will encourage and facilitate exchange visits by the Naval Forces; exchange visits by commanding and general staff officers; cooperation in military training through:

Cadet and officer exchanges from military and staff colleges and visits by members of these institutes; officer for on the spot training in some military establishments or units; reciprocal participation in conferences and symposiums by high-ranking officers from headquarters and staff colleges; officer exchanges from battalion and regiment sections, as well as exchanges by equivalent counterparts in the Naval and Air Forces.

The two sides will encourage and facilitate sports activities for teams from the Armed Forces; cooperation in the joint use of the social facilities when accommodating soldiers during visits, contacts, and on the spot training of military personnel; military orchestra exchanges.

11. The procedures, programs, and other conditions relating to the realization of the contacts set out in paragraph 10 will be determined in yearly protocols.

III. Implementation Assessment

12. After one year, or earlier by mutual consent, representatives from the two sides will conduct a meeting to discuss the present and future implementation of these measures.

13. The measures adopted in this document are politically binding and will come into force as from 1 January 1992.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Draft Plan Would Allow Soviet Troop Transit

AU2412122091 Prague CSTK in English
1643 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 20 (CSTK)—Soviet soldiers returning to former Soviet republics from Germany will be able to travel through Czechoslovakia if a draft agreement completed here Thursday in talks between Czechoslovak and Soviet representatives is approved by both Czechoslovakia and the post-Soviet republics.

Officials from the Czechoslovak Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Transportation, and other federal bodies, met with Soviet military transportation officials and representatives from the Ukraine to work out the draft intergovernmental agreement.

Czechoslovak Transportation Ministry spokesman Frantisek Spicak told CSTK the draft agreement would be presented for consideration to the Federal and Republic Governments. It must also be approved by the Federal Assembly (parliament) before taking effect.

RESPONSE TO BUSH INITIATIVE

Obukhov Cited on Nuclear Disarmament Talks in U.S.

*PM0512170791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Dec 91 First Edition p 3*

[TASS Diplomatic Correspondent A. Surzhanskiy report: "15,000 Soviet Nuclear Warheads Eliminated by Year 2000"]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Dec—"The second round of Soviet-U.S. consultations on nuclear disarmament just ended in Washington was extremely productive and useful," Aleksey Obukhov, head of the Soviet delegation to the consultations and USSR deputy minister of external relations, said. This round of talks was special, he noted, in that the USSR and the United States began a concrete examination of a number of issues relating to the implementation of the initiatives submitted by the two countries' presidents as regards the safe handling [bezopasnoye obrashcheniye] of, control over, and elimination of nuclear weapons.

According to the Soviet diplomat, an important result of the consultations was the sides' confirmation of their commitment to the Soviet-U.S. statement of 1 June last year on future talks on nuclear and space arms and on further strengthening strategic stability. Aleksey Obukhov reckons that this effectively heralds the resumption of the negotiating process on this subject without "unwarranted holdups."

When asked by TASS's correspondent about the U.S. position on halting nuclear tests and the possibility of its subscribing to the USSR's unilateral moratorium, the deputy minister said that the U.S. side's position remains the same, its main argument being that it is unready to take such a step.

Aleksey Obukhov reported that, within the framework of a program for global protection against limited strikes, the United States is proposing to deploy a system of ABM defense capable of intercepting up to 200 nuclear warheads. When asked whether this project would bring about a fresh spiral of the arms race, the Soviet diplomat said that "there is this worry," adding that the "USSR's readiness to consider this U.S. idea should not be seen as all-out agreement with it."

Speaking about the planned schedules for the elimination of both countries' armaments, Obukhov said that a start to the dismantling of U.S. nuclear warheads would be made in the first half of 1992, the intention being to complete this in 1997. As for the destruction of the Soviet nuclear potential, the Navy's tactical weapons are to be eliminated by 1995 and tactical missile warheads by the year 2000. The diplomat attributed this time difference to the more imposing scale of this work in the USSR. The intention is to eliminate roughly 15,000 Soviet nuclear warheads in all.

Aleksey Obukhov noted that representatives of all republics with nuclear weapons (Russia, Belarus [Belorussia], Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) took part in the Soviet-U.S. consultations, confirming their commitment to the concept of "centralized nuclear control."

START TALKS

'Drastic' Nuclear Arms Cuts Urged for Future

*PM0512144091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 45, 12-18 Nov 91 pp 18-20*

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability at the Foreign Policy Association of the USSR, and Thomas Cochrane, senior researcher at the Natural Resources Defense Council of the United States: "Finale Is Important, Not START"]

[Text] Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed last July after many years of negotiations. The targets set in the Treaty can hardly inspire even optimists, however.

The slashing of the strategic arsenals of each of the two powers by the year 2000 from more than 10,000 nuclear warheads to 6,000 does not accord much with the widely declared aim of partnership. It can be repeated hundreds of times that Moscow and Washington no longer regard each other as enemies. The bipolar military confrontation will remain a fact, however, if the two powers continue to keep thousands of nuclear warheads aimed at each other.

Semi-Partners, Semi-Enemies

Since the nuclear missile potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States remain at high levels their missiles are aimed at each other simply because there are not so many targets in the rest of the world. The two countries do not have political or strategic reasons to attack each other, and are not expected to have such in the near future.

The White House and the Kremlin obviously see this contradiction, as is evident from President Bush's initiative and Mikhail Gorbachev's reply in September and October which proposes a faster arms reduction compared with that envisaged by START. It is a half-measure, however.

Washington proposed large-scale measures. One of them is elimination of all ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with independently targeted warheads which constitute up to 60 percent and about 20 percent of the total in the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. Simultaneously, Washington announced measures for dismantling and placing in depots nuclear arms from heavy bombers, lowering the degree of their take-off readiness, and removing old missiles to be scrapped from combat alertness (four percent reduction in the total amount of warheads).

Instead of going further, Moscow made only a timid half-step by proposing to cut the strategic arsenals of the two countries to 5,000 (not 6,000) nuclear warheads, remove nuclear weapons from bombers, and withdraw slightly more obsolete missiles, to be scrapped under the Treaty, from the state of combat alertness within a shorter time.

An Expensive Undertaking

In the next ten years it will not be easy to decide on taking deep cuts in the ground- and sea-based ballistic missiles. First of all, the processes of dismantling, elimination and conversion involved in the reduction of weapons are economically expensive and technically complex. Even cuts under START, modest by present standards, will require considerable expenditure.

Secondly, a sharp reduction in the number of warheads will call for a more drastic reduction in the number of carriers, for a large part of missiles have multiple warheads. As a result, the Soviet Union and the United States would retain a small amount of ground-based missile launchers and a considerably shrunken fleet. Mutual vulnerability would increase, thereby undermining strategic stability. The situation could be corrected by way of deploying missiles with monoblock heads instead of multiple warhead missiles with a large part of forces consisting of mobile launchers. It is a very expensive undertaking, however, and it will take much time to implement these measures. The Soviet Union, with its economy in a deplorable state, has little, if any, possibility of putting this idea into effect.

Lastly, a more drastic reduction would call for new talks and, since we are living in the nineties, it would overlap the time limits of START. The finished treaty would be put off again for the sake of a more attractive but unfeasible objective.

The Hidden Race

There is a way out nevertheless. During the nineties the strategic nuclear forces of the two powers could be reduced not to 6,000 or 5,000 but to 10 percent, to 1,000 warheads for each party, without undermining stability and national security and without additional excessive expenditure, without discarding START, which was worked out with great difficulty.

Signing START in the summer of this year, the two parties intended first of all to cut obsolete armaments while continuing to deploy new expensive systems (multiple-warhead missiles, heavy bombers, mobile land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, both with monoblock and individually targetable heads). As a result, by the year 2000 the two powers would have cut their forces by 30 percent. However, they would have completely modernized them by enhancing their striking power. Moreover, they would have to spend money on the modernization of missiles, the elimination of old ones, and measures of control.

START does not at all envisage the reduction of nuclear weapons in this way. Another approach could be based on two principles. First, it is a qualitative exchange as regards destabilizing systems and, second, a broader use of the method of "unloading" ballistic missiles, that is, removal some of the warheads from the multiple warhead instead of eliminating missile carriers and their launchers.

Nuclear Stumbling Block

Mutual elimination of destabilizing systems. Moscow should at last agree to a reduction of heavy silo-based SS-18 missiles not by half, as specified in START (to 154 units), but to zero. These missiles, each carrying ten warheads of a megaton class, are a cold-war legacy. They are regarded in the West as silokillers, first strike weapons, particularly because they are not fit for a retaliatory blow since they will not "survive" in their silos. At present 104 SS-18 missiles are deployed in Kazakhstan and the rest 204 on the territory of the Russian Federation. They are produced at the Dnepropetrovsk missile plant in the Ukraine.

Strategic armaments of this type are like a stumbling block in the way of radical disarmament. They impel the United States to develop countersystems: 50 silo-based Peacekeeper missiles, each carrying ten warheads, and 96 Trident-2 ballistic missiles based on submarines. Trident-2 missiles, each carrying eight warheads, are deployed on four new submarines of the Ohio class. Thanks to their high accuracy they are intended to hit Soviet silos.

Soviet SS-24 missiles are similar to the Peacekeeper system. Ten of these missiles (the weapons are produced in Pavlograd) are based in silos in the Russian Federation and 46 in the Ukraine. They would have to be dismantled, too, especially since they are a tempting and vulnerable targets and are fit for the first strike only.

Thus, Moscow would dismantle two systems - 364 missiles (3,640 warheads) and Washington would do the same - 146 missiles (1,268 warheads). Moreover, it would give up plans of deploying 336 more Trident-2 missiles (2,688 warheads) on the other 14 submarines of this class.

The method of complete "unloading" (to zero) could help to withdraw much more quickly and cheaply all the obsolete ground- and sea-based missiles which were to be destroyed under the Treaty. Otherwise, the statements on their removal from the state of alertness cannot be verified. If the parties concerned detach all the warheads from these missiles and put them in storage, agree on additional procedures of control and thereby withdraw them from the nuclear balance, the dismantling of these missiles, silos and submarines could be effected over a longer period. This could be done with less expenditure, and the ways of using the systems for peace purposes could be thought out thoroughly.

The remaining advanced systems should be partially "unloaded." It will be a quick and cheap reduction of the number of warheads, and their concentration and vulnerability will decrease at the same time.

Generals Can Sleep Quietly

In 1995 the United States would have 940 ground- and sea-based missiles, 20 submarines and a total of 2,460 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union would retain 1,146 missiles, 21 submarines and a total of 2,400 warheads in its strategic offensive arsenal.

In other words, by 1995 (instead of 2000) the two countries would have lessened their arsenals of warheads not by 30 or 50 percent, as Gorbachev proposed in October, but by 75 percent. Without breaking the asymmetry usual for the Soviet General Staff, the United States would have roughly 70 percent of its warheads on the sea and the Soviet Union—about 60 percent of its warheads on land. The Americans will traditionally retain slightly more warheads and the Soviet Union—a few more carriers.

All this can be achieved with less expenditure while strengthening stability and preserving the START structures. Besides, by combining unilateral and reciprocal measures the two parties could maintain the military strategic parity so dear to the hearts of brass hats. True, the vast programmes of modernization will have to be curtailed sharply, but in any case this will be required by the economic situation. Let the military-industrial complexes of the two powers put up with the present situation. The era of militarist bonanza is over.

It is necessary, of course, to weaken the restrictions on "unloading" which are specified in START for fear of uncontrolled "reverse loading." The system of control can be extended considerably. Let inspectors stay permanently at missile bases, airfields and ports. At worst, the two countries will have roughly equal opportunities for a reserve expansion (2,000 to 2,500 warheads and missiles from the stores).

The second stage, covering a period from 1995 to 2000, will call for START-2. There will be time to work out such a treaty in the first half of the current decade. The new treaty could be based on the principle of a further "unloading" of missiles, up to the complete removal of warheads from some portion of missiles. The missiles will remain in their positions while the warheads will be kept in stores under the permanent control of the other party.

When Missiles "Grow Thin"

As a result, the United States will retain 100 silo-based monoblock ICBMs of the type of "unloaded" Minuteman-3 or new, Midget-man missiles and 400 missiles in silos, but without warheads. Its naval force would consist of 18 Ohio-class submarines equipped with Trident-IIs (or a missile of a new type), each with two warheads.

The Soviet Union would have 400 ground mobile SS-25 missiles, plus 250 silo-based SS-19 and SS-25 missiles "unloaded" to zero. The missiles on Typhoon submarines would have not four but three warheads each, while the missiles on 13 Delta-IV (Delfin) submarines could be "unloaded" from three to one warhead.

In all, the United States will have 18 submarines and 932 missiles in active service (including missiles with removed warheads), and 964 nuclear warheads in firing trim, whereas the Soviet Union will have 19 submarines, 978 missiles and 968 warheads. In other words, the strategic arsenals will be cut by 90 percent (in the number of warheads) while the number of carriers and warheads will be roughly one to one, that is, close to the ideal of stability. The opportunities for a "reverse" will be equal, too.

The reduction of the number of warheads below the 1,000 level is not only of symbolic but also of political-strategic importance. The nuclear weapons of the two countries will become comparable in their amount (while keeping a substantial "unloaded" reserve) with the forces of other nuclear powers. The bipolar nuclear confrontation will cease, and Moscow and Washington will be able to candidly say that they are no longer enemies or opponents in the strategic respect. The other nuclear countries could be drawn into the process of multilateral cuts.

And the last thing. Such measures are possible if strict restrictions are preserved on the deployment of strategic anti-missile defence, including ground- and space-based interception systems. For this reason Moscow's consent in October to devise a non-nuclear anti-missile system seems to be a wrong decision (as if no one knew before that the Strategic Defence Initiative is a non-nuclear programme). The two powers have far more promising areas of cooperation, including cooperation in achieving the aims by which the "joint" anti-missile defence system is justified.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Russian Defense Aide Urges ABM Cooperation With U.S.

924P0046A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with V. V. Shlykov, deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense, conducted by staff observer Pavel Felgengauer: "Antiballistic-Missile Defense: Together With America or Against It: Global Confrontation With America No Longer Exists, But Nuclear Threat Remains"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Col of the Reserves V. V. Shlykov, deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee on Defense and former employee of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), talks with NEZAVISIMAYA

GAZETA'S observer. For the past eight years Vitaliy Vasilyevich was chief of a directorate in one of the GRU's research centers, which was responsible for assessing the military and economic potential of foreign countries.

[Felgengauer] On 15 October the British newspaper the INDEPENDENT surprised many political observers by publishing an article about possible Soviet-American cooperation in the area of antiballistic-missile [ABM] defense. In particular, it mentioned (citing you) that during a Soviet delegation's visit to Washington there was serious discussion of the possibility of establishing in Russia with American help an antiballistic-missile defense system that could protect against a missile (nuclear) strike on the part of Kazakhstan or Ukraine. Could you comment on this rather strange statement? And is it true that certain possibilities for cooperation in the military area were found between the United States and the USSR (Russia)?

[Shlykov] The article in the INDEPENDENT seems highly symptomatic to me. The world community is feeling serious concern, if not to say alarm, in connection with the collapse of Soviet defense structures. There are a good many inaccuracies in Peter Jenkins' article, but it is still timely. Western governments and the Western public are increasingly unwilling to be satisfied by our political leaders' assurances that everything is in order, that nuclear weapons are under complete control and there is no cause for concern. In my view, the situation is not so sunny.

[Felgengauer] But who in the final analysis controls Soviet nuclear weapons? With every passing day more and more republics are in one way or another declaring their rights to nuclear weapons. At present, if you believe some statements, a new command and control structure is being formed that is still just as secret as before. The secrecy in and of itself gives rise to many questions.

[Shlykov] A number of ambiguous statements by Ukrainian and Kazakh leaders indicate that a uniform viewpoint has not yet been worked out. I am concerned that the statements about the complete reliability of over Soviet nuclear weapons are being made by the same politicians who previously claimed that "a military coup is impossible in the USSR." The public has a right to know the true state of affairs.

[Felgengauer] Tell us, just what provided the reason for the sensational article in the INDEPENDENT?

[Shlykov] During the first 10 days of October a Soviet military delegation headed by Army Gen Konstantin Kobets, chairman of the Military Reform Committee and Russian state counselor, visited the United States. In addition, the delegation included Col Gen Mikhail Kolesnikov, deputy chief of the General Staff, Lt Gen Igor Kalugin, commander of long-range (strategic) aviation, and others. Incidentally, I should note that this was a union-Russian delegation and there was no talk of

singling Russia out or of any sort of separate cooperation with the United States in the defense area.

On 6 October Henry Cooper, director of the American SDI program, spoke to us. Incidentally, Cooper is the first civilian appointed to that position. Previously it was held by career military officers. Cooper noted that this was the first time that he had held talks with Soviet military personnel as colleagues rather than adversaries, as in the past. The United States hopes that the new spirit of cooperation will make it possible to modify the 1972 ABM Treaty and, with mutual agreement, deploy a limited antiballistic-missile defense system.

New technologies make it possible to develop a substantially more reliable defense system than those envisaged by the 1972 treaty—and incidentally, a less costly one.

[Felgengauer] The Americans eliminated their old Safe-guard system, but Moscow's antiballistic-missile defense system is still in operation, although many specialists believe it is not too effective.

[Shlykov] It is not just that the old system is ineffective, it is dangerous. The sooner we abandon it, the better it will be.

The world has changed over the past year or two. The previous simple USSR-U.S. balance no longer exists. And at the same time, more and more countries are armed with ballistic missiles and are also acquiring nuclear capability. The previous balance of mutual deterrence [ustrasheniye] will soon become ineffective. For example, Saddam Hussein delivered a missile strike against Israel not only without fearing a retaliatory strike (possibly a nuclear one), but actually wishing to provoke such a strike.

The Americans are also worried by the prospects for the development of the situation in the USSR. A number of independent republics could emerge that are armed with strategic nuclear weapons aimed at the United States and its allies.

[Felgengauer] You mean Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia and Kazakhstan?

[Shlykov] Of course, those are precisely the republics I meant. Moreover, the supposition was expressed that even other nuclear powers that threatened not just the West but each other could emerge on the USSR's territory. Strategic missiles cannot be used in internal conflicts—they threaten the United States, which is worried that central control over part of our strategic potential could be lost. The most reasonable response to such threats would be a limited antiballistic-missile system.

[Felgengauer] That is, it is being proposed that the balance of fear (mutual assured destruction) be replaced by a balance between defensive and offensive forces?

[Shlykov] Yes, especially defensive forces. Spaced-based systems are especially promising. The American limited global defense system, GPALS, which is presently being

developed, could (theoretically) protect Russia's territory against a missile strike launched from a distance of several hundred kilometers (that is, from the territory of neighboring states).

(The GPALS plan provides for the deployment of 750 land-based interceptor missiles on U.S. territory, 50 early-warning satellites, and 1,000 space-based interceptors, as well as a substantial number of regional land-based and sea-launched interceptors.)

All of our delegation's members—career military officers—listed with great interest and satisfaction to the proposals for cooperation between the USSR and the United States in developing a global antiballistic-missile defense system. I must emphasize the fact that such a system is supposed to be under reliable international control.

[Felgengauer] Do you believe that the American scientists are close to completing this development project?

[Shlykov] They are advancing very effectively in that area. We must give serious thought to the possibility of collaboration.

[Felgengauer] And how exactly might that collaboration express itself?

[Shlykov] Our delegation did not discuss specific forms of collaboration. The present situation would allow us to make a general decision to the effect that collaboration was necessary, and after that specific proposals would be possible.

[Felgengauer] Last week I met with a representative of the Canadian Strategic Research Center. He said that, in his opinion, the U.S. administration is presently interested only in modifying the 1972 ABM Treaty, which would allow it to begin deploying the SDI. After the USSR agreed to the American proposal, the antiballistic-missile defense would be deployed, but one could not seriously count on advanced technologies or, especially, elements of the system itself being transferred to the USSR. It seems to me that such a development of events could result in a substantial increase in global instability and utterly unpredictable consequences.

[Shlykov] Such reasoning does not particularly contribute to the creation of a genuinely safe world. The United States has always had the possibility of denouncing the ABM Treaty, and given the present alignment of forces in the world, that would hardly threaten it with any serious complications. However, the American administration has chosen a different course: to begin a series of talks in order to move from the 1972 ABM Treaty to a system of arms control in cooperation with the USSR.

[Felgengauer] I recently met with a high-ranking Israeli diplomat accredited in Moscow, and he assured me that the United States at present does not have any completed antiballistic-missile system that is ready for immediate deployment. The Israeli military remains

extremely dissatisfied with the performance of the American Patriot missiles in battle: they were unable to provide reliable protection for Greater Tel Aviv, and when they did manage to hit an Iraqi ballistic missile, the fragments from the Scud and the Patriot itself fell on residential areas and thereby caused substantially greater damage. At the same time, Israel has developed its own first-rate regional antiballistic-missile defense system, which Israeli developers could offer the USSR and the United States for deployment of a limited ABM system.

[Shlykov] The development of the American-Israeli Arrow missile system is 80-percent financed by the United States. The United States would not finance the Arrow program if it were not more effective than the Patriot system. However, American systems of the new generation will probably be superior to it.

It must be said that great confusion has arisen in our country with regard to the prospects for deployment of an antiballistic-missile defense system in the United States. I am afraid that President Gorbachev's closest aides and scientific advisers previously instilled the idea in him that the deployment of an ABM system was a lengthy, costly and technically relatively unfeasible undertaking. Consequently, the USSR decided to respond to the SDI program by continuing to build up its offensive missile power (the "asymmetrical response").

During my service in the GRU of the USSR General Staff, I tried to call the leadership's attention to a fundamental mistake in assessing the American economy's mobilization capability. In peacetime, when \$3-4 billion is allocated for ABM, one needn't expect the early deployment of an effective system. And that is just what the present generation of Soviet political leaders counted on. But they failed to take historical experience into account. When the United States was launching the Manhattan Project, no one abroad could expect that in two years an atomic bomb would be developed. In the United States (unlike the USSR), the best forces and minds and the greatest resources are by no means put to work in the defense branches. But if necessary, if a serious threat emerges, the United States can make antiballistic-missile defense a nationwide task and repeat the Manhattan Project. It can throw hundreds of billions of dollars and the best minds into it. The theoretical research work in the field has advanced far enough that there are no serious doubts that such a all-out effort could lead to the development in two or three years of a reliable antiballistic-missile shield that would protect America against any attack employing ballistic missiles. Moreover, I am speaking of a thoroughgoing ABM system, not the limited GPALS project. Therefore, the buildup of Soviet missiles and the deployment of newer and newer systems that took place in the 1980s seems extremely irresponsible today.

As a result, the USSR has fallen very seriously behind in the area of strategic defense, and an effective ABM system is still needed for the secure existence of the

USSR (Russia) even now, when there is no global confrontation with America. Nonetheless, Soviet developers are perfectly capable of offering the United States a great deal that is useful should matters reach the point of actual collaboration in the development of a global ABM system. Only in cooperation with the United States is it possible to somehow stabilize the world situation for a period of any length.

Future of Aerospace Defense System Pondered

PM0412153191 Moscow KRASNAYA

ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Nov 91 First Edition p 1

[Report on interview with Colonel General of Aviation V. Prudnikov, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces, by correspondent Major A. Ivanov; place and date not given: "View of the Problem: What Should Aerospace Defense Be Like?"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] What does the future hold for the Air Defense Forces following the creation of a new branch of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Deterrence Forces? What effect will the dismemberment of the current unified system's component parts—missile early warning systems, ABM defense, control of space—have on our combat capabilities and what kind of structure should they have under present conditions?

Our correspondent Major A. Ivanov met Colonel General of Aviation V. Prudnikov, commander in chief of the Air Defense Forces and USSR deputy defense minister, and asked him to answer these questions.

[Prudnikov] Contemporary offensive aerospace weapons today are capable of independently performing strategic as well as operational tasks and, in some cases, determining the outcome of a war before ground forces are brought into the battle. This was confirmed by events in the Persian Gulf area. Therefore, despite the substantial easing of international tension, developed countries are continuing their work to improve offensive aerospace weapons and means of using them in combat. The day when these weapons will be capable of operating at virtually all altitudes—from the lowest to outer space—under a single concept can be said to be near at hand. Thus, the aerospace is a unified indivisible sphere for potential military operations. And we must be ready for that.

Possible large-scale enemy operations in air and space must be countered by retaliatory defensive measures on an equal scale, forcing the enemy to renounce his objectives. An extremely complex task. It can only be accomplished by forces equipped with modern arms and organized into a definite system with a single centralized command. In other words, it is a question of developing an aerospace defense system for the country as the most important component of the Armed Forces in conditions of defensive military doctrine.

Obviously any single sovereign state that is part of the renewed Union is incapable of creating such a system. On the basis of common security interests, the system must be built on the territories of all republics and must perform defensive functions within a single aerospace.

The foundations of this system are laid in the current air defense structure. It undoubtedly requires substantial reorganization and retooling. But the main point—and I am profoundly convinced of this—is for it to be a unified system. Any fragmentation of Aerospace Defense Forces (be it in terms of republics or in terms of branches of the Armed Forces) will inevitably result in considerable expenditure on developing parallel command structures. That is costly, particularly today, and ineffective.

Given the reduction in defense spending, it is hard to develop mighty groupings of Aerospace Defense Forces in all areas of the country. So, we must have mobile Aerospace Defense Forces that can swiftly be moved from one sector to another. And that is only possible with centralized command.

Systems like that operate successfully in the United States and NATO. Control of all Aerospace Defense Forces is exercised at centralized level. It is typical that, regardless of the changes in NATO countries' political leadership, the unity of Aerospace Defense and its component—air defense—remains unchanged. They continue to strengthen and grow.

Aerospace defense must incorporate comprehensive reconnaissance and aerospace attack warning systems along with space-missile and air defense. In peacetime they can be tasked with monitoring air and space, reconnaissance and warning, and guarding the sovereign republics' state borders. In wartime—with defending highly important troop groupings, military and state command posts, military and economic installations, communications, and the Union states' administrative and political centers against air and space strikes. The composition and numerical strength of the aerospace defense forces must be such that they can repulse the first such massive strikes.

A special role is allotted to aerospace reconnaissance whose data may cause decisions on retaliatory action to be promptly made. But such data can only be obtained through the comprehensive use of data received through radiotechnical, radar, and other kinds of ground, air, and space reconnaissance.

All republics currently have elements of a reconnaissance and warning system. Dividing them up among the national armies will cause the destruction of the unified whole, and receiving information through collaboration—as has been proved on several occasions—is ineffective.

In peacetime—in conjunction with a single air traffic control system—aerospace defense monitors compliance by all departments' aircraft with the procedure for use of air space and for crossing the state border. This task can

only be performed successfully with a single radar field across the entire country. Imagine for a minute all the sovereign republics creating their own radar reconnaissance and air traffic control systems. Given the current intensity of air traffic, particularly in the western part of the country, and the existence of international air corridors over our territory, no single air traffic control center could perform its task without information from a unified radar system. Without such a system it is impossible to help aircraft in distress.

So, the union of sovereign states' aerospace defense system must be unified. Its role in modern warfare has risen considerably. It is also an important strategic factor for deterring an aggressor. I think that it is the duty of the political and military leadership in the sovereign states which join the Union to promote the development of an aerospace defense system as a guarantee for the security and the strengthening of the sovereignty of each state and of the Union as a whole.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Proposals at Vienna CSBM Talks Described

*LD0412165291 Moscow TASS in English
1613 GMT 4 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna December 4 TASS—The negotiations on confidence-building measures and improving security [CSBM] in Europe discussed here today three proposals on the limitation of military activities of member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The proposals were put forward by Austria, Hungary and Poland, the Soviet Union and NATO states.

The proposals have much in common, primarily the suggestion to limit the number of military arrangements involving over 40,000 soldiers.

The authors of the three documents proceed from the fact that such arrangements should be conducted only in extraordinary cases, and no more often than once in two or three years with a two-year preliminary notification.

The Soviet and NATO proposals have a similar provision on the limitation of the number of military arrangements, involving over 25,000 soldiers.

Other similar suggestions have also been made, although differences remain, mainly those connected with the establishment of specific parameters to limit military activities.

For instance, the Soviet Union calls for the establishment of a maximum level of 75,000 men for any such activity. The NATO proposal does not contain such a suggestion.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to introduce limitations in three areas: personnel, combat tanks and APCs [armored personnel carriers]. Whereas the NATO proposals say nothing about APCs.

There are some other differences, some more substantial, though not intransigent.

As for the Soviet side, it is ready to show necessary flexibility in order to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement, acting head of the Soviet delegation to the negotiations, Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, told TASS.

In particular, we are ready to agree on lower parameters for military activities, involving over 40,000 men, to be carried out once in two years: 600 tanks instead of 800, and 900 APCs instead of 1,500.

Additional parameters for the maximum level of arrangements, involving over 75,000 men, 900 tanks and 1,500 APCs, could be established.

This would enable a considerable rapprochement between the Soviet and Austrian, Hungarian and Polish proposals, and, thus, expand mutual understanding.

Kulebyakin expressed hope this step will encourage other sides to take efforts for an early compromise with respect to the interests and considerations of various states-participants in the negotiations.

Estonian Foreign Minister Seeks UN Role Forcing Soviet Withdrawal

Calls For UN Troops

*LD0412185491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1700 GMT 4 Dec 91*

[Text] The Estonian foreign minister, Lennart Meri, has called for the sending of the United Nations force to the Baltic states. He said the aim of the action would be to deter a threat from the Soviet Union. The Estonian foreign minister, paying a private visit to Bonn, said in an interview on the Deutschlandfunk radio station that the Soviet Union continued to refuse to pull its troops out of his republic. Lennart Meri believes that the sending of the United Nations peacekeeping force would reduce the risk of violent conflicts in the northeast of Europe.

Sees Continued Soviet Threat

*LD0412095891 Hamburg DPA in German
0739 GMT 4 Dec 91*

[Text] Cologne (DPA)—Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri has come out in favor of the deployment of UN troops in his country. The Soviet Union has so far refused to reduce its troops stationed in Estonia in accordance with the treaty, the Estonian politician said on Deutschlandfunk radio Wednesday [4 December].

He was disturbed that "Soviet paratroopers are still stationed only 45 minutes from the parliament in

Tallinn," he said. The deployment of UN troops in the Baltics could therefore help to prevent possible violent conflicts in northeastern Europe. UN troops, Meri went on to say, should in the future not be used "as a last resort." In view of the threatening dangers in the Soviet Union, they could dampen crises. Such a UN deployment would, in Meri's view, also support democratic forces in the other former Soviet republics.

Meri is currently in Bonn at the invitation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Further on Disputes Over Soviet Pullout From Lithuania

Vilnius Claims Army Property

*PM0512134991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Dec 91 First Edition p 11*

[By correspondent K. Uspila: "Who Is Owner of Soviet Army's Property?"]

[Text] Vilnius—"All immovable property in the possession of the Soviet Army on Lithuanian territory is the property of the Lithuanian Republic," said Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, commenting on Lithuanian radio on the recently adopted law "on the illegal possession by the USSR Armed Forces of property on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic."

The deputy head of parliament said that the new law determines that all deals and contracts on the transfer of land and forest to the military units "are void from the moment they were concluded" and declares establishments and buildings erected on "illegally occupied territories" to be illegal. The government has been instructed to establish order and to organize the transfer of this property.

The same document declares to be invalid all "contracts on supplies imposed on the organs of power of Lithuania, self-management organs, or economic organizations." Ceslovas Stankevicius explained that this does not mean that military establishments' supplies of water or electricity, for instance, will be cut off in the very near future. But, he said, this should be done not as a "duty" but on the basis of "goodwill" and in accordance with "trade relations" procedure.

Deputy Premier Notes 'Signs' of Withdrawal

*LD0812100191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius
International Service in Lithuanian 0200 GMT
7 Dec 91*

[By Roma Pakeniene]

[Text] The negotiations between Vilnius and Moscow on the withdrawal of the Soviet Army are still being delayed. However, there are some signs of the withdrawal. Radio Vilnius has been told about this by Deputy Prime Minister Zigmas Vaisvila, who is coping

in the Lithuanian Government with affairs concerning the withdrawal of the Army.

The most evident example is that three-quarters of the Soviet Internal Troops have been withdrawn from Lithuania. No such troops will be in Lithuania by 1 February 1992. As is known, these troops are not the subunit of the Soviet Army. They are subordinate to the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs and mainly carry out the functions of patrolling and protecting prisons. Four regiments of these troops are deployed in Kaunas, Siauliai, Vilnius, and Snieckus. Two special regiments in Snieckus were sent to Lithuania at the beginning of this year and took part in the January events in Vilnius. According to Zigmas Vaisvila, these regiments are no longer in Snieckus. Approximately 100 people remain in each regiment in Vilnius and Kaunas. They guard the prisons. The training regiment in Siauliai should be withdrawn in December.

By February of next year, when the Ministry of National Defense takes over the protection of prisons, there will be no interior troops in Lithuania. In all, there were up to 10,000 such troops.

The interior troops constitute only a small part of the Soviet Army. The withdrawal of the interior troops from Lithuania is taking place in accordance with the dates coordinated by the Lithuanian and Soviet Ministries of Internal Affairs, although there are no signed official documents.

According to Zigmas Vaisvila, there are signs that the regular Army is also moving silently and unnoticed from Lithuania. It is learned from well-informed sources that Moscow has given orders to withdraw from Lithuania the most expensive equipment and to cease construction. The fact of withdrawing equipment has been confirmed by Zigmas Vaisvila. In addition, construction units have left Snieckus.

Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Government demands that by the new year two airborne divisions, Soviet reconnaissance units, and all military units stationed in Vilnius be withdrawn from Lithuania. According to Vaisvila, there are fewer men in the motorized infantry division in Vilnius than before, and some equipment is being taken away. This, in the opinion of the deputy prime minister, is linked with Gorbachev's decree about renaming the Baltic Military District the Northwestern Military Group, thus admitting its stay on the territories of other states. According to international practice, such army groups are not deployed in the state capitals. According to that decree, the Soviet military headquarters has been transferred from Riga to a reserve command locality in Adazi, not far from the Latvian capital.

In Riga, as in Vilnius and Tallinn, the Army numbers are noticeably declining. It is assumed that there were about 10,000-12,000 soldiers in Vilnius, and, according to various sources, in Lithuania the number could be from 40,000 to 80,000.

Preparations to leave have been noticed also in three airborne divisions deployed near Kaunas and Alytus. Vaisvila expressed his doubts about their imminent move. These divisions have well-equipped bases and hardly will be ready to easily hand them over. The same can be said about the Soviet reconnaissance units.

At the beginning of October Lithuania's representatives were allowed into the most important object of the Soviet military intelligence—the center for monitoring and state communications near Kaunas in Linksmakalnis. Their inspection started but later stopped, and the military did not allow anyone in. According to Zigmas Vaisvila, the government will be compelled to take strict and unilateral actions.

Information is on hand that an Air Force unit started moving from Lithuania. One unit is deployed near Siauliai. The anti-aircraft defense units are also preparing to leave. They are deployed near Vilnius, Snieckus, and on the Baltic coast.

The government is concerned about such secret withdrawal of the Army because it has claims to a part of the Soviet Army's equipment. Lithuania is ready to negotiate about this, but Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius thinks that the whole Army wealth in Lithuania is the property of Lithuania. According to him, Lithuania's contribution to the Soviet military budget constitutes about 2 percent. This means Lithuania may have a claim to this amount.

No less concern is created for the Lithuanian Government by a rather critical situation in the Soviet Army units themselves, especially in the so-called northern townlet in Vilnius. According to Zigmas Vaisvila, not only ordinary soldiers but also officers are often engaged in heavy drinking there. Lately there have been shootings and human casualties.

Last week the Vilnius military were playing by switching off electric power in several Vilnius housing estates. Recently there was a conflict between the soldiers in the paratroop unit in Rukla, near Joanava. According to the military, paratroopers from the famous Pskov division arrived there to introduce order. The number of crimes committed by Soviet soldiers has sharply increased in Lithuania. The unit commanders admit themselves that they do not control the situation. The commander of the Army stationed in the Baltic states, General Mironov, is also concerned about this. He has asked the Lithuanian Government to investigate these conflicts and other crimes in the Soviet units.

Radio Vilnius was told by Zigmas Vaisvila that all this shows what a dangerous hotbed this Army is. One should recall recent ultimatums by the military stating that they would not obey orders to leave the Baltic states. About a month ago they stated that they would not leave Lithuania until normal living conditions are created for them in Russia. Not long ago there was a broadcast on Lithuanian TV where they complained being abandoned both by their leadership and by the presidents of Russia

and the Soviet Union. Therefore, they have decided to form a coordinating council to defend the rights of the Russian-speaking residents in the Baltic states. According to them, all decisions on the withdrawal of the Army must be coordinated with that council. They also appealed to President Gorbachev and the Russian leadership, demanding that their rights be controlled, social guarantees ensured, and the withdrawal of the Army not increased.

The Lithuanian Government is ready to help the military solve social problems and has accomplished a great deal in this regard. For instance, a decision was adopted recently to allow the military to sell at auction apartments that they vacate. They want this very much.

Meanwhile, the Soviet military leadership is asked to state how many military men wish to leave. Knowing their number, we would be able to talk and negotiate on the creation of social well-being for these people in Russia or somewhere else, Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius said in his television broadcast.

This number is not known. According to Deputy Prime Minister Zigmas Vaisvila, delay is not useful to either side, because it increases social and political tension. The Lithuanian Government believes that with goodwill and political wisdom all problems of the Soviet Army in Lithuania can be solved without difficulties. In the opinion of Zigmas Vaisvila, two years would be sufficient for this. By the beginning of 1994 there should not be a Soviet Army in Lithuania.

Landsbergis Seeks Aid To Speed Withdrawal

*OW1212115691 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1115 GMT 12 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis has sent a letter of congratulation to the Russian President Boris Yeltsin on signing the Brest accords. He praised the "resolute actions of the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus."

The message urges Yeltsin to appeal to the West together for economic aid that would promote the faster withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania. (The Soviet military insist that the withdrawal cannot begin before 1994.) According to Landsbergis, this aid could be spent on the solution of the socio-economic problems of servicemen transferred from Lithuania to Russia. The Lithuanian leader invited Russia to send a commission to study the needs and problems of servicemen in the republic.

Lithuania Fears Soviet Army Trains Transiting From Germany

*LD0512193991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 4 Dec*

[Text] What is the Soviet Army transporting through Lithuania? Correspondent Romas Jankauskas reports from Klaipeda:

The main cargoes on the international ferry are at present Soviet arms. Tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, and other weapons and equipment are being ferried from the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, from Mukran to Klaipeda. All this can be seen when they continue their journey through Lithuania. And what do the closed freight cars contain? The Soviets had not only explosives, but also dangerous, toxic, and radioactive substances, which poison our homeland's environment and people.

The contents of one freight car at the international ferry railway station appeared suspicious to the Lithuanian customs officials. Why did it seem to be suspicious? Strange as it may be, our customs officials do not have any means to establish degrees of toxicity or radiation. However, the freight car was examined by the Klaipeda regional agency of the Lithuanian Environmental Protection Department. The agency's director, Vladas Korsakas, completed his tests today. It was established that the freight car was loaded with 95 barrels of harmful chemical substances. Radioactivity was established, too: The scale showed 11 microrentgens. This is a tolerable norm, and the freight car was allowed today to continue its journey through Lithuania.

Luckily, this time it was only such a load. How many more dangerous, more poisonous loads pass through the customs? The customs officials do not have instruments to measure the degree of harm, but also do not have the right to check Soviet closed military freight cars.

Is this normal on the border of independent Lithuania?

Latvian Government Views Fate of Soviet Army Property

*LD0512225191 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0530 GMT 5 Dec 91*

[Text] At a sitting of the republican government, a decision was made on the issue of determining the status of USSR military housing resources and the arrangements for allocating housing for soldiers and officers retiring from the Army. It was decided that the use and release of these residences is to be settled in talks between the Republic of Latvia and the USSR. In taking over Army property in accordance with the resolution by the Latvian Supreme Council, Army sites will continue to be divided among various firms and cooperatives (?as suitable). But it is intended that [word indistinct] institutions will be invited, so that state property is not allowed [word indistinct] in an illegal way.

In Riga alone, more than 200 former military sites and buildings are due to be taken over. As Talvas Jundzis, the Latvian minister of defense, reports, work is still continuing at the Defense Council Coordination Centre, which is concerned with the Latvian defense force, the Home Guard of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Guard of the Supreme Council, and the Border Guards, and the coordination of these forces in the event that the [word indistinct] hour arrives and the many warnings of a possible new coup are fulfilled. The situation in neighboring states is so unstable that we have to be prepared for anything, says Talvas Jundzis. He will also meet with the commander of the Northwestern Military Group, the former Baltic Military District, Valeriy Mironov, who has promised to move the headquarters of the military group from Riga to Adazi. That will take place no earlier than the end of next year.

Latvian, Soviet Officials Discuss Withdrawal

*LD0612043191 Riga Radio Riga Network
in Latvian 0900 GMT 5 Dec 91*

[Statement by Latvian Defense Minister Talvas Jundzis on "unscheduled" meeting with "high-ranking representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense" on 5 December 1991; from the "Daily Review" program—recorded]

[Text] I met today with the commander in chief of the Land Forces of the USSR, the deputy commander of the USSR General Staff, and the commander of the Northwestern Military Group. Yes, this meeting had not been planned in advance, I must say. But, in connection with the visit by these senior men to Latvia, they decided to visit me, too, as the newly elected defense minister, to get to know me, as they emphasized. Getting acquainted is a good thing, of course, but our talk touched on specific problems. I raised the question of the various problems that worry us in Latvia, specifically those associated with the withdrawal of troops. In the first place, we spoke about how the Baltic Military District Headquarters has been abolished and that the Northwestern Military Group's must now be relocated to Adazi and on the decree of the president.

We are uneasy about the timetable offered us by the military leaders, which is by the end of next year. We believe that these premises, which belonged to the Latvian War Ministry once, must be vacated far sooner. We also spoke about other cultural sites, especially in Riga, which do not have any strategic significance for the Soviet Army and which could be vacated much faster.

We also spoke about Liepaja Harbor, and the military personages promised that they would delve into this question, and, anyway, that they would strive to settle this question so that this port, too, could be used for civilian purposes.

We then raised the question of the land tax. We have adopted a law that all organizations and enterprises must pay a land tax, except the Army. This question also was

recognized in the generals' notes, although the Army made no promise about whether this tax will be paid.

We recalled that a meeting was held in Moscow in September between our government's representatives and the USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and that a protocol was signed there. Unfortunately, however, some points of that protocol have not been fulfilled. For example, the USSR side has not shown any initiative or readiness to form a Latvian and USSR mixed commission provided in this protocol on (?vacating) army sites. Also unfulfilled is the point in the protocol on the handing over of forests currently at the disposal of the USSR Army located on Latvian territory to the appropriate Forestry Ministry of our government. We agreed that, yes, there would be new talks.

This has been the first time that I have had such a meeting with representatives of the USSR Army at such a high level, the first time that interest has been shown in Latvia's security as an independent state as well. On the one hand, it was gratifying to hear the proposal, to hear the commander-in-chief of the USSR Land Forces himself express readiness, or more exactly a proposal, to offer assistance in the defense and security of control of our state's air borders. He expressed his readiness to give (?advice); discussions here in Latvia on this question would be necessary. Such a (?tone) at the talks is, at least, pleasing to me. We agreed that in 10 days we will present in written form all the proposals made during the talks, so that they will not just remain (?notes). After that we will organize the next meeting, where we also will settle how these proposals can be discussed specifically and what is to be done about them.

In turn, the USSR generals promised me that they, too, can present proposals connected with ensuring the rights of soldiers of the Soviet Army, officers' rights, with fulfilling various requests, shall we say. We gave an understanding that we also are prepared to examine these proposals.

Troop Withdrawal From Germany Status Reported

*PM1012143591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Dec 91 Second Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "Withdrawal Proceeding According to Schedule"]

[Text] So far 105,000 of the 337,000 soldiers and officers of the Western Group of Forces have been sent home from Germany, as have 55,000 of the 205,000 civilian personnel and members of servicemen's families. This has been reported by the ADN agency.

The Soviet troops have already been completely withdrawn from 58 places where they were stationed. In all, the Western Group of Forces has released 260 military establishments and the German side has taken on 237 of

them. As of today 33,000 units of combat equipment and transport families have been removed from Germany to the Soviet Union.

Progress in 'Open Skies' Talks Welcomed

*PM1012140591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Dec 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel V. Dmitriyev: "Openness and Trust: Registration in the Skies"]

[Text] The trend toward the normalization of the international situation which we have been observing increasingly clearly in recent years has made it possible to take a new look at the problem of openness and trust in the activity of the armed forces. In February 1990 the NATO countries and the states which used to belong to the Warsaw Pact Organization (22 states in all) entered into multilateral talks on an "open skies" regime. Their aim is to elaborate an agreement which would make it possible on a reciprocal and equal basis to carry out flights by noncombat unarmed aircraft over the territories of the states acceding to the agreement for observing military activity. There is no doubt that the implementation of such an agreement would promote the further consolidation of trust and would largely remove the concern which sometimes arises in connection with the activity of the armed forces of the states which have signed this agreement.

Specialists note that the other merits of the "open skies" agreement include the opportunity to use observation flights to monitor the observance of accords in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. Observation from the air is sufficiently effective and, which is of some importance, is cheaper than from space. In addition the process of monitoring could be joined by the small European states.

Two stages of the "open skies" talks have already been held. And the third stage has been under way in Vienna since 4 November. The experts of the countries taking part in this forum have reached practical agreement on the parameters of the future regime. Before that the principles for forming and using pools of observation aircraft, the staff of the observation apparatus, the quota (number) of observation flights, and questions of the processing and use of observation data had been elaborated at the talks.

The attainment of progress at the "open skies" talks largely became possible thanks to the mutual desire of the USSR, the United States, and other states taking part in the talks to find mutually acceptable solutions to vexed issues. But it cannot be said that they have all been resolved already. For instance, a definitive solution still has to be found to the problem of so-called territorial envelopment. In this connection it should be noted that the Soviet side's statement of its agreement to open the USSR's territory to observation flights and of the possibility of seeking on a bilateral basis a mutually acceptable solution regarding the supply to us of information

about U.S. military activity on the territory of third countries which are not participants in the regime switched the talks to a practical channel. Their progress and the businesslike and constructive atmosphere which took shape at them make it possible to hope that this question will also be fully resolved.

Many observers following the talks note that they have reached the finishing straight. The sides have already put on the table the renewed texts of articles of the draft agreement. There is a hope that the final legal formulation of the "open skies" accord could be completed by the start of the Helsinki meeting of leaders of the CSCE states which should take place in March 1992.

Poll Reports Views on European Troop Withdrawal

*OW0912081991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0733 GMT 9 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] 42% of the participants in the July poll by the National Public Opinion Studies Center (VCIOM) did not agree that the removal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe was premature. 2798 people in a representative survey of the country responded.

30% said that the Soviet Union rushed troop removal.

28% did not give a specific answer.

Margin of error is 3%.

Moldovan-Romanian Council Urges Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*OW1012043691 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1945 GMT 9 Dec 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The National Reunification Council (NRC) involving parliamentarians from Moldova and Romania urged the Romanian Government Monday (9 December) to promote the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Moldova with the help of the international community. The NRC's statement says that "these troops have repeatedly perpetrated acts of aggression against peaceful civilians, thereby threatening a bloodshed." The NRC realizes that the two artificially created states on Romanian territory can no longer exist, the statement notes. It urges the governments of Moldova and Romania to look for "acceptable ways of restoring Romania's historical borders."

Troops To Withdraw From Baltics 'After 1994'

*PM1212154991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Dec 91 First Edition p 5*

[USSR Defense Ministry Press Center reply to reader's letter under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "Group Instead of District"]

[Text] "The Baltic Military District has been renamed the Northwest Group of Forces, which is now on the territory of independent states. What status will servicemen of the new group of forces have? Is it proposed to withdraw it? A. Vasilyev, Kaunas."

The status of servicemen of the Northwest Group of Forces will be decided in the course of talks with the governments of the Baltic states. The timing of the talks has not yet been established. As regards the withdrawal of this group of forces, it can be carried out no earlier than the end of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany, in other words after 1994.

This reply was obtained from the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakh President Confirms Nuclear Testing To End

*LD0512141691 Moscow Radio World Service
in English 1300 GMT 5 Dec 91*

[Text] The President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev has confirmed his resolve to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests on the Semipalatinsk proving ground. He noted at the same time that a vast scientific and technical potential has been formed on the testing site and he does not object to having it used for peaceful research.

President Nazarbayev said he has exchanged views with the president of Russia on nuclear arms tests. They are both convinced that there should be no more such tests in the Soviet Union in general.

Scientist on Need for Nuclear Arms, Continued Testing

*924P0045A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 14 Dec 91 p 5*

[Interview with R. I. Ilkayev, first deputy chief designer at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics (ARIEP), conducted by Sergey Brezkun, staff member of a design department at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics: "Nuclear Arms Shield"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Interviewer: From the very outset we decided that we would speak, in so far as possible, not about today (and even less, about yesterday), but about tomorrow. However, I began with a traditional question: "Radiy

Ivanovich, you are a professional nuclear arms specialist and the developer of many weapons systems and experimental weapons. A natural question is whether what was done should have been done?"

R. I. Ilkayev: I will permit myself to answer in the words of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov, who said in reply to a similar question: "At the time I believed, as I presently believe, that in turning that weapon over to the Soviet government I was contributing to the maintenance of strategic ... stability. ..." At any period of our work, that circumstance was so self-evident for all of us that it helped us cope with any doubts, if they arose.

S. B.: But they did arise?

R. I. Ilkayev: To doubt even the obvious is a natural property of human nature. And if I say that I have no doubts as to the correctness of the undertaking in which we were engaged, that means that the doubts were always constructively resolved. How can you waver, as a citizen and a patriot, as to whether your country should be reliably defended? For us professionals the essence of the matter always lay not in ideological confrontation but precisely in the simple fact that not a single major state can get by without weapons, and therefore, if you have chosen the lot of developing them, you should make the most effective and powerful weapons.

S. B.: But Radiy Ivanovich, can this terrible creation of inhuman power be called a weapon? Isn't it a means for the self-destruction of humanity? After all, it has long since been understood that this "weapon" should not be used.

R. I. Ilkayev: No, it should not be, but does that mean that it could or should be abandoned? I do not want to assert some sort of truth and am merely inviting my contemporaries to think about the past, present and future—not of nuclear weapons, but of global civilization. Personally, for the next few decades I do not see any real substitute for the nuclear component of global stability, especially if we have in mind that "part" of it that belongs to our country.

This, of course, is a very complicated matter. I must say that in our milieu there was never even dislike, not to mention enmity, toward, for example, the United States of America and the American people. On the contrary, we did and do regard them and all other states and peoples of the earth with respect. I am profoundly convinced that it is absolutely essential to reduce the level of confrontation and raise the level of trust. We are not militarists.

However, the status quo is the status quo. And just as people do not have the right to resort to methods of force to settle disagreements, they do not have the right to a frivolous forgetting of their own history. The major states' interests are still, alas, inseparable from military power. And in Russia this truth has special significance.

S. B.: "If you want peace, prepare for war." But Russian Admiral Markov said: "Remember war." I think there is greater wisdom in those words.

R. I. Ilkayev: I wouldn't like to talk about war, even in purely theoretical terms. Properly speaking, it is precisely in order to make it impossible that we are doing what we do. Therefore, I would only try to give a new interpretation to the old saying: "Remember past wars in order never to have wars in the future."

S. B.: One gets the feeling that not just the public at large but many of those who have to do with real politics do not have an entirely clear idea of what "nuclear weapons" are in the concrete, material sense. It is long past time to say: in a certain sense a nuclear weapon, once it has been brought "into the world," is physically indestructible! Whereas the uranium-235 contained in a warhead still could, after considerable effort, be ground up, say, into fine dust and mixed with the natural rock from which it was once extracted, plutonium is an artificial element. It is extremely dangerous ecologically and alien to both the living and nonliving nature of the planet. And the problem of dismantling nuclear weapons is, perhaps above all, the problem of plutonium.

R. I. Ilkayev: In many respects, yes. There are difficulties in stockpiling and storing it—both for economic reasons and for reasons, as we say, of critical-mass safety. For environmental reasons, and for many others.

S. B.: Perhaps enough has already been said to understand: getting rid of nuclear weapons once they have been created is no easy task. And no cheap one, either. But so far we do not see any desire in our society to analyze the situation thoroughly and painstakingly. Instead, a kind of disarmament euphoria is spreading.

One of the main areas in which you have been applying your efforts today, Radiy Ivanovich, is enhancing the safety of weapons. How is one to understand the term "enhancing," generally speaking? Does it mean that so far safety has been poor or inadequate?

R. I. Ilkayev: Sergey Tarasovich, I understand that you are asking the question from the viewpoint not so much of a professional as of someone who is simply the citizen of a nuclear power, and that is right. It must be explained. In particular, I will remind you: over the decades of the existence of weapons in the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, France and China, and the operation of tens of thousands of units of weapons, not a single disaster has occurred with them. Yet these are nuclear weapons!

And have mercy, friends! Constantly improving and enhancing the safety of such systems is our sacred duty. The point is not that safety is "poor" or "inadequate", but that it can always be improved. But now, unfortunately, the situation is developing in such a way that even such a key problem as the problem of safety is being pushed to the background. Just quite recently my colleagues were already speaking out on this account, but

here it is impossible to overstate the case, and I am simply obliged to warn one more time: "In stopping or curtailing much arms work, we are, for all intents and purposes, embarking on a course of losing both our country's nuclear weapons complex and nuclear weapons themselves!"

S. B.: However, I somehow have not heard any statements from state leaders repudiating the doctrine of nuclear equilibrium. On the contrary, one constantly hears about the nuclear attentions of first one then another republic. Just what is going on?

R. I. Ilkayev: As for nuclear intentions, let's talk about that later. But here is what is happening among us: the prestige of our endeavor has declined. And as a result, people are leaving us. These are cadres of scientists, experimenters, engineers and workers who are unique in terms of knowledge and ability and are in many respects less, but often even more, valuable than the most costly equipment.

And if all of them quit the ARIEP (and the second nuclear center, the All-Union Research Institute of Theoretical Physics in the Urals), that could create a new national, or even global problem.

S. B.: Why?

R. I. Ilkayev: First of all, because nuclear weapons would then almost inevitably fall into the hands of nonprofessionals! And the threat of the lack of professionalism in nuclear matters is an extremely serious threat. Nuclear weapons cannot be dealt with just any old way! The professional possesses not just knowledge but also a sense of responsibility cultivated over decades. And to a significant extent it is that sense that will not allow him to work without a feeling of the importance of his work and without the corresponding material accompaniment to it: equipment, research, testing. The nonprofessional does not sense the complexity. He is bold, but bold with the bravery of ignorance. He will unquestionably be tractable, and that will be to the liking of many people. Those same government bureaucrats.

These new "professionals" will not need either appropriations or testing. They will be prepared to dismantle weapons practically with their bare hands, and it is extremely distressing to imagine in advance what else they will be prepared to do. What price will society have to pay for such a readiness?

I would like to say something else. Right now we must not only preserve the old professionalism but acquire a new professionalism.

There can be no doubt: a considerable part of the potential of the ARIEP should be reoriented toward purely economic work. We should help the fatherland by working to provide not just peace of mind but also abundance.

There is also the extremely important problem of recycling the reduced weapons, destroying and storing the

nuclear warheads that are being taken out of use and other environmentally dangerous components of military hardware that is being destroyed. We can solve it in an informed and comprehensive fashion, but all this requires great effort.

However, not just our efforts! A concrete state conversion program must be developed, and the country's leaders must give their attention to it. I have no doubts: a wise and statesmanlike attitude toward the ARIEP today cannot fail to pay off even in purely market terms tomorrow. After all, many billions have been invested in the scientific, engineering, experimental and social infrastructures.

Under the "roof" of one research institute, the equivalent of ten research institutes and design bureaus, by ordinary measures, have worked (and not worked badly) for decades. And our entire past, and not just ours, indicates that the concentration in one place of major research, engineering and production potential provides for the successful and rapid accomplishment of very large and serious tasks.

S. B.: At a recent conference you, Radiy Ivanovich, said approximately the following: "A new constructive nuclear policy is needed". In this connection, a question: "Just what is it, a constructive policy, as a professional nuclear specialist understands it?"

R. I. Ilkayev: I think that it is even more important to know how politicians, rather than weapons scientists, think about it... But I would like to finish with this theme. I would only like to note one thing: It is to be desired that we understand correctly... We were taught by the very character of our work to feel its state significance in our bones. We were sure that for any knowledgeable and responsible man the proposition—that nuclear weapons and everything connected with them were the holy of holies of the state's sovereignty—was obvious and needed no proof of its truth... It was an axiom... It turned out that proof was needed. Very well, we are ready to consider both general and concrete themes... An I would like to emphasize that—to any audience and in any mass information media.

S. B. There is one more concrete theme, about which there has been a lot of noise: "Are weapons tests necessary?"

R. I. Ilkayev: To be brief, they are necessary—One encounters statements by certain physicists to the effect that one can get by without testing. Interesting statements. I would be extremely grateful if their authors would come to see us in Sarov and teach this to us.

It has always been common for us in our country to take the approach: "And how do the Americans over there do it?" For some reason with regard to testing this approach has suddenly proved inapplicable, although to this day it continues to be popular in other areas. And the United States is carrying on normal and essential work to

develop more modern weapons and, of course, is conducting tests. Although, honestly speaking, both its laboratory and computing capabilities are greater. Nonetheless, it is not abandoning testing. Incidentally, our de facto abandonment of testing, which is hard to explain from a professional standpoint, is capable, objectively speaking, of reducing rather than increasing confidence in us.

However, I would like to shift the discussion from tests to a different, rather controversial plane. Tests are necessary. But minds right now are confused and inflamed. Could it be that for a time, until heads calm down and the economic situation improves, we should undertake a kind of compromise? The arms specialists do not insist on an immediate resumption of testing, and the politicians, the mass media and the peoples try to understand that nuclear tests are not a whim but a necessity.

Might it make sense—let's put it this way—to put on the brakes? Not to close down testing ranges, say, but to mothball them? And then, to see how things stood?

S. B.: Personally I think this idea merits consideration. Especially since, before analyzing whether testing, modernization, etc. are needed, it would not be a bad idea to determine, not just in words but in deeds, whether we, our country, need nuclear weapons. Let us put the question to ourselves as follows: Shouldn't nuclear weapons, as a factor of coercion to peace, be not the first but the last weapon with which humanity parts?

R. I. Ilkayev: That is what it should decide now. Just so a mistake isn't made, especially in our country. Whether the union or Russia. Because the problem, in general, is invariable with respect not just to states but even to changes in social institutions. And here, incidentally, it is appropriate to mention the republics' nuclear intentions. They, of course, are groundless. Not just because their implementation would create a mass of problems for the entire world community, but because only a major power that is comprehensively developed in terms of science and technology is capable of having a nuclear complex! A power that possesses nuclear centers and methodologies, equipment and personnel, and test ranges. A nuclear weapon is not just a charge with an appropriate index, but a complex set of ideas, work, knowledge and traditions.

Now for the main thing. Here it is important to proceed from the recognition: does our society need a defense complex, as a centuries-tested guarantee of sovereignty, or not? I will refrain from citing certain proposals and ideas on this score, but I dare hope that no responsible state or political figure can deny the need itself for a defense complex. Granted, the defense complex was attached to the obsolete system and requires profound transformations. I agree. But changing does not mean destroying!

Nuclear weapons are a reliable, tested factor in peace. A means of deterring global irrationality and adventurism. If this is understandable, it is also understandable that it

is impossible not to preserve them. Indisputably, their numbers and types must be steadily reduced, but we must not allow their main, primarily deterrent functions to be lost.

That is, first: the set of properties that ensures, within the limits of sufficiency, a deterrent role must be realized. This is a complex and extensive aspect, and for now I will only designate it, moving on to the second one. It is more understandable, since it entails the familiar problem of security. Nuclear weapons must be secure in peacetime (however, I cannot conceive of any other time) for the country and people that possess them. That is what must be understood. That is what must be recognized more quickly.

S. B.: By whom?

R. I. Ilkayev: First of all, by the leadership of the country and leadership of Russia. And in the final analysis, by all of our fellow countrymen.

S. B.: Do they understand, Radiy Ivanovich? Do they recognize it?

R. I. Ilkayev: It appears that they do not very well. Hence both the erosion of policy and the failure understand that any research and experimental-design work, especially in defense, is the least costly but also most vulnerable part of the military budget.

And we—here there can be no ambiguity—sincerely want both understanding and a strengthening of our working relations with the political leadership. The times right now are not easy, but it is precisely in our "eparchy" (although, of course, not only in it) that accord must reign. After all, that eparchy is a highly specific one.

S. B.: And, most likely, it is important to eliminate the anonymity of defense policy, anonymity of decisions, and lack of glasnost on the level of world standards?

R. I. Ilkayev: That, too. But what is especially dangerous is the lack of proper attention on the part of the top leadership. Nuclear policy as the basis of defense doctrine as a whole should be the object of constant attention by the top people in the state! Just as it is, for example, in the United States! This is an area in which we find numerous examples where we can imitate them.

S. B.: Speaking of the United States, do you have in mind not so much the defense policy itself as the approach to it?

R. I. Ilkayev: Of course. And if you compare ours and the Americans' potential policy, you have to say that what we need to do right now is strive not for parity, but to ensure the sufficiency of our nuclear weapons. Because parity means, generally speaking, a continuation of the arms race.

S. B.: Radiy Ivanovich, first of all, thank you. And second, how shall we finish?

R. I. Ilkayev: Well, I dare say, as follows: It sometimes seems to me that today's country—both the leadership and all of us—still has yet to clearly understand what a vast legacy we possess. A vast legacy developed over decades. Including a legacy in the area of defense. We would have to try awfully hard in order not to be capable of dealing with that legacy intelligently. For the good of humanity.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

No Evidence of Laboratory Found Near Irkutsk

LD0812154391 Moscow TASS in English 1139 GMT
8 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Khodiy]

[Text] Irkutsk December 8 TASS—"There is no information which would directly or indirectly indicate that the secret military laboratory, through the fault of which an outbreak of anthrax occurred in 1979, is now located near Irkutsk," Mikhail Savchenkov, deputy chairman of the East Siberian branch of the Academy of Medical Sciences, told TASS.

He is heading a commission specially set up by the local administration to check a report that appeared in the press at the end of November that the laboratory had been relocated from Sverdlovsk to the Transbaykal area.

"A check-up carried out through military and civilian channels confirmed that there has been no research team for the development of bacteriological weapons in the area in the past and present," the commission head said.

However, this does not rule out the necessity of making an official inquiry at the Defence Ministry and the Government of Russia into the further destiny of the super-secret laboratory.

More on 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Investigation

924P0043a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Dec 91
Union Edition p 8

[Report by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent A. Pashkov:
"The End of the Urals Anthrax Legend"]

[Text] Ekaterinburg—Moscow—Anthrax is not produced in Yekaterinburg now, maintains the man who, on Andropov's order, was in charge of the "clean-up" of the military laboratory.

Previous IZVESTIYA materials (Nos. 268, 279, and 289) told in detail how anthrax had gotten out of the bacteriological laboratory on the 19th Military Base and took tens of human lives. Testimony of counterintelligence General A. Mironyuk proved it beyond any doubt.

Besides Mironyuk, however, and Andropov's deputy Pirozhkov (who still firmly insists on the "meat" version, there was one more man, who reported daily to the

KGB chairman, Central Committee Secretary Suslov, and Minister of Defense Ustinov on the "anthrax" situation in Sverdlovsk.

"When it became clear where the thing was coming from, no more coded messages or cables were sent to Moscow," says General Yu. Kornilov, former chief of the KGB Sverdlovsk Administration. "I doubt that any documents on this topic will be uncovered in Moscow. Everything has been thoroughly cleaned up. I will tell you frankly: Until 1979, I knew little about this base and its purpose. It was subordinated directly to the General Staff. It is true that immense efforts had to be expended before the true cause of the outbreak became clear."

I was able to talk to those who 12 years ago were using operational methods to look for the source of infection in Sverdlovsk. Naturally, in those times their first thought was to find the saboteurs. (By the way, G. Arkhangelskiy, deputy chief of the 19th Base, believes to this day that there was an enemy hand in it.)

So, all resources were thrown into searching for spies. There were, in fact, two Americans working in Sverdlovsk at that time. Husband and wife. They came to the Urals by way of scientific exchange and certainly could have brought something to undermine the industrial potential of the "defense region." There were also occasional echelons with foreign equipment arriving in Sverdlovsk. Often, suspicious sacks were found in boxcars. Their contents were sent to be analyzed—turned out to be insecticide.

"In parallel with saboteurs," recalls Yu. Kornilov, "the KGB at that time was also investigating the 'meat' version. Quite a few interesting things were discovered in this respect, too. A number of disposal grounds where at various times animals infected with anthrax had been buried, turned out to be unsupervised, some in disrepair. Specialists maintained, however, that the infection was coming not from the depth of the planet or even from the oblast, but from Sverdlovsk."

It is hard to tell why "competent organs" for so long—almost two weeks—were gingerly avoiding the military base instead of seriously investigating this version right away. It appears that any totalitarian state is organized in such a way that numerous "competent organs" know their place very well and do not stick their nose where it does not belong. In any case, everybody in the city was talking about the military lab, while the search initially was being conducted outside its walls. There were, by the way, concrete testimonies of people who did not keep silent even then.

V. Perlin, then the Chkalovskiy Rayon chief epidemiologist, used to have access to the territory of the military base, but it was during those days that his access clearance was lifted—a fact he immediately reported to his superiors. Vladimir Nikolayevich speculated that this was where the infection was coming from. These were guesses based on indirect evidence, but subsequent tests

on the samples of grass, road surface, and so on confirmed that the anthrax was of airborne origin. This did not jive with the "meat" version.

V. Perlin told me that the military possibly wanted to "make sure of the results of their 'work'" this way. At first glance, it was a preposterous idea. On the other hand, recalling what had been done in the Hitler and Stalin camps with the blessing of the government system, one should not rush into declaring this hypothesis absurd.

In any case, the editors received several anonymous letters saying that they, employees of the 19th, asked the journalists not to waste time on trifling investigations—we deal not only with anthrax here, they said, but also with plague, all of which is necessary in order to strengthen national defense capabilities. As to accidents—it happens to anybody.

Having presented his point of view, V. Perlin explained that there was one more circumstance that makes him think this way: From all indications, there had been not one, but two discharges, since the outbreak of anthrax lasted for almost two months.

Vladimir Nikolayevich was right. The first outbreak took place when, as the result of negligence on the part of service personnel, the pressure on the "housing" of the ventilation system sharply increased and the filter burst, letting out the spores of anthrax. They fanned out over the territory where people started to die. Mironyuk's scheme, and later aerial photos, confirmed this.

The second outbreak that took 18 more lives took place later, when the preventive work—the washing and the clean-up of the region—started. A mortally dangerous thick layer of dust had accumulated on the roofs of the ceramic plant's shops. Had the people been wearing elementary respirators, many would have remained alive.

Later, Mikhailov, chief of the 19th Military Base, committed suicide. Smirnov, his superior who supervised the objects on the General Staff side, at some time said in a conversation with one of the main actors in this story that he would kill himself if the true causes of the outbreak became known. He died of natural causes, and God is his judge. But the harsh truth must be told. By concealing the true cause of the anthrax outbreak from the medics and specialists, the military, whether they like it or not, had conducted a horrible experiment on their own compatriots.

Having gotten rather late into untangling the most plausible version, the "competent organs" also contributed to a degree to the duration of the inhuman experiment. This circumstance is of principal importance today, since our conversation with Yu. Kornilov took an unexpected turn in the end.

The point is that three Russian deputies—General Kornilov, Deputy Chairman of the Yekaterinburg City Executive Committee Skripchenko, and Presidential Adviser Lakhova—are pushing through a decision to get the military laboratories on the 19th Base engaged in production of antibiotics, blood substitutes, and heart medications. A respective document has already been signed by Minister of Defense Shaposhnikov.

Nobody wants to argue that we have a catastrophic shortage of medicines, especially the aforementioned ones. And it is true that behind that barbed wire there is a concentration of highly skilled professionals and first-class equipment. But after what happened, who can give a guarantee that a new danger to the city will not emanate from the territory of the military lab, whose activities basically remained secret even from the "competent organs?"

"At Andropov's direction, I personally supervised the "clean-up" of the base and the removal of the equipment," says Yu. Kornilov. "I remember, they even tried to bar my entry into one sector, although I knew with certainty that Anthrax strain had been detected on the equipment... The clean-up of the laboratories continued for five years: floors were replaced, and plaster removed. I guarantee that this is a clean production facility now. It should not be allowed to go to waste."

G. Arkhangelskiy, deputy chief for scientific research, also tried to convince me that they are not what they "used to be." There are enough civilian controllers here now, he argued, and the rayon physicians are checking ventilation ducts and sewage disposal. My interlocutors were even using the fact that Americans are coming here soon—negotiations are being conducted with them on the delivery of necessary equipment—as heavy artillery in the safety argument.

I agree that we should not thoughtlessly and barbarically destroy what took years to build: either nuclear power stations, or defense objects. Or, even worse, disperse highly skilled personnel. But I am deeply convinced that until the trust of the people is restored, until strictest safety measures are implemented, another production that could become a source of a potential threat for a million-population city should not be started here. The state has not made restitutions yet to the victims of 1979, while it is going ahead with new projects. As before, the interests of a concrete individual remain on the wayside of grandiose projects...

"There is no information that shows, directly or indirectly, that a secret military laboratory responsible for the outbreak of Anthrax in 1979 is located near Irkutsk," Mikhail Savchenkov, deputy chairman of the Eastern Siberia Branch of the Academy of Medical Sciences told a TASS correspondent. He heads a commission, specially created by the local administration to investigate press reports the end of November that this laboratory had been moved from Sverdlovsk to the Baykal area.

The investigation is being done through both military and civilian channels. It has been confirmed that there had not been, and is not, a scientific unit for developing bacteriological weapons here, said the commission head. However, this does not preclude the necessity of sending an official inquiry to the Ministry of Defense and the government of Russia, asking for an investigation of the fate of the supersecret laboratory.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Envoy on Sino-Soviet Border Troop Reduction Talks

Results of Fifth Round

OW0512130491 Moscow Radio in Mandarin
2200 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Report on interview with (Zhileyev), head of the Soviet delegation to the fifth round of Soviet-Chinese talks on reducing military forces in border areas and on strengthening trust in the military sphere by station correspondent (Shardov); place and date not given; from the "Hello China" program]

[Text] [(Shardov)] What are the chief results of the fifth round of talks? What important steps have been taken toward reducing military forces on the Soviet-Chinese border and enhancing trust?

[(Zhileyev) speaks in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] (Zhileyev) said: I would like to refer you to a sentence in the press communique issued by the Soviet and Chinese sides at the end of the talks. It says: The two sides made some progress during the talks. What does this mean? The talks touched on numerous important issues. Among them were elements for reduction, the types of armaments and military technologies involved, the use of such information as initial data on the levels of military force after the reduction, and monitoring and (?confidence-building) measures. During the Moscow talks, we made certain progress on such important issues as the guiding principles for the reduction of military forces. The two sides narrowed the differences in their positions. The most important achievement is that we reached agreement on the elements for reduction—Soviet and Chinese Army and Air Force border units. Strategic missile corps, air defense units, and naval troops fall outside the scope of reduction, because these units are not the principal elements of military confrontation between our two countries. This is the first point.

Second, during the Moscow talks, the Soviet and Chinese sides presented their drafts of a general agreement to be concluded in the future. These drafts were based on the exchange of opinions during previous talks. Hence, many principles were (?identical) or similar. (Zhileyev) stressed: This has enabled both sides to take an important step toward reaching a general agreement in the future. I would like to add that during the Moscow talks, we successfully exchanged views on (?strategic) issues.

This is very important, because we can narrow our differences of opinion by clarifying our positions. Besides, we can begin working out specific measures addressed in our drafts of the general agreement.

Says Talks 'Businesslike'

OW0612121791 Moscow Radio in Mandarin
2200 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Report on interview with (Zhileyev), chief of Soviet delegation at fifth round of Sino-Soviet border troops reduction talks, by unidentified reporter; date, place not given; from the "Hello China" program]

[Text] Both parties to the fifth round of talks on reducing troops in Sino-Soviet border areas have agreed to cut their Army and Air Force units. The talks ended on 1 December. This was disclosed by (Zhileyev), leader of the Soviet delegation, at the end of this station's interview with him. Other results of the Moscow talks include attainment by the two sides of identical or similar stances on many clauses in their future joint agreement on mutual troop reductions in border areas and on confidence buildup in the military sphere. During the interview, (Zhileyev) described the atmosphere at the Soviet-Chinese talks.

[Begin recording] [(Zhileyev) in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] Soviet diplomats only tersely noted that the talks were held in a friendly and businesslike [you hao he wu shi] atmosphere. This characterization is not only confined to the atmosphere of the talks. Our talks have lasted two years. During that period, delegates from the two sides fostered close relations. Our relations do not only reflect concerns about the business at hand. They reflect understanding and mutual trust. We did not argue with or attack each other during the talks. Instead, we discussed issues of common concern in a businesslike and constructive fashion.

Of course, we raised some very sharp issues. This is natural because the issues are very complicated. They concern many aspects of life in the two countries that are extremely sensitive and delicate. For instance, they pertain to defense capability and national security.

But neither side attempted to impose its wishes on the other. We held immediate or preparatory discussions of the proposals made at the talks before holding formal discussions. I would like to stress that the atmosphere is particularly favorable to bringing the stances of the two sides closer. It enabled us to conduct the talks smoothly.

[Reporter] Was it very difficult for you to make decisions during the talks?

[(Zhileyev)] Sometimes it was indeed very difficult. [end recording]

The head of the Soviet delegation to the Sino-Soviet talks on border troops reduction continued: Why was this? I have already explained it. The main reason is that the issues under discussion are too delicate. Nevertheless,

the two sides reached an understanding prior to the talks that any decision should be based on the following two points: First, it should not hurt the defense capabilities and national security of either side. Second, any future agreement should not harm a third country's interests. Both the Soviet Union and China hope to work together for the cause of peace and to contribute to security in the Asia-Pacific region.

[Begin recording] [Reporter in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] The Chinese delegation reportedly visited the Northern Caucasus Military District after the talks. Can you tell us the purpose of the visit?

[(Zhileyev)] I would like to point out that we started exchanging visits to each other's military districts once we initiated the talks. One of the purposes of our talks was to enhance mutual trust in the military sphere. It is generally agreed that such fact-finding visits can lead to the successful resolution of related problems. Another purpose of those visits is to establish direct contacts among troops and military departments and personnel between the two countries. I believe that my Chinese counterpart, Wang Ganghua, head of the Chinese delegation, holds the same view. The hospitable and sincere reception accorded the Chinese delegates during their visit to Northern Caucasus has added new dimensions to our friendly contacts in Moscow. [end recording]

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Russian Officials Comment on Nuclear Weapons Plans

Nuclear Sufficiency Envisaged

OW0312162291 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1514 GMT 3 Dec 91

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Russian leadership plans to have a nuclear potential within the range of "optimum or minimal reasonable sufficiency," said Mr. Gely Batenin, RSFSR deputy foreign minister, in an exclusive interview with DP [Diplomatic Panorama] on December 3. He and the representatives of the other sovereign ex-Soviet nuclear republics—the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Byelarus [Belorussia]—were members of the Soviet delegation at Washington talks to reduce strategic and tactical weapons. The talks were led by Soviet deputy foreign minister Aleksey Obukhov.

All the republics including the Ukraine spoke at the talks in favour of preserving a common nuclear strategic space, said Mr. Batenin. They also emphasized the importance of centralized control of nuclear weapons. According to them, a common centre will be required to

control the nuclear weapons. However, none of the republics strongly supported the idea of common armed forces.

Mr. Batenin does not believe that in the future the ex-Soviet sovereign states will conduct nuclear disarmament talks on their own. An understanding was reached that a common negotiating mechanism is required, as well as a common position—a necessity in view of the geostrategic space the Soviet republics share.

'Legal Succession' in Control

OW0912143391 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 9 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at a press conference in Moscow in conjunction with the decision of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine to create a commonwealth of independent states, that in the near future "there should be a guarantee of the civilized transfer of authority with regard to control over the 'nuclear button.'" According to Kozyrev, legal succession in this issue will be preserved. "With regard to the mechanism for transferring control over the atomic button, and who will now have such control," Kozyrev noted, "these questions will now be decided through negotiations." He ruled out the possibility of any dictate "from one side or another."

Officers Say No Nuclear Arms at Estonian Garrison

OW0512183791 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1525 GMT 5 Dec 91

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] According to the newspaper "Postimees", officers of the Tartu military garrison have issued a statement assuring residents of Estonia that there is no nuclear weapons on its territory.

The statement says allegations of Estonian deputy Yuriy Liim that the garrison has nuclear weapons do not correspond with reality.

The garrison's Command is to hold a news conference for Estonian and foreign journalists on the issue December 8th.

Ukraine's Kravchuk on Nuclear Weapons Policies

To Be Non-Nuclear State

LD0812142691 Kiev Radio Kiev Network
in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 6 Dec 91

[Excerpts] The gala sitting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet dedicated to the results of the all-Ukrainian

referendum and the election of the president of Ukraine took place yesterday. Our correspondent, Vasyl Byrzov, reports:

[Begin recording] [Byrzov] [passage omitted] Then a solemn inauguration of the president of Ukraine took place. Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk solemnly took the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. [passage omitted] Then Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk made a speech. He noted key points in domestic and external policy. Here are some principal points of the president's speech:

[Kravchuk] [passage omitted]

We say again and again: The Ukraine intends to become a non-nuclear and neutral state in the future. We consider the nuclear weapon of the former Union on our territory as that which is located on it temporarily. Our goal is to completely liquidate all nuclear weapons on the territory of the Ukraine and to transform the Ukraine into a non-nuclear zone. The Ukraine confirms its international commitments and declares its legal succession as regards all treaties and agreements of the former Union that correspond to general human norms and do not contradict the fundamental interests of the Ukrainian people. [passage omitted]

Discusses New Missile Command System

LD0912190191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1822 GMT 9 Dec 91

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksandr Litvinov]

[Excerpt] Kiev, 9 Dec (TASS)—A news conference given by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk today was devoted to the agreement on a Commonwealth of Independent States of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.

Acquainting journalists with the document, Leonid Kravchuk drew particular attention to the fact that the agreement does not envisage the creation of unified structures of administration, with the exception of a collective command of strategic forces.

The Ukrainian president explained that previously the president of the USSR has had the launch button at his disposal, but now a different system has been created. Now, in order for missiles to be launched, three buttons must be pressed simultaneously, each of which is under the control of one of the members of the Commonwealth. If one of them should press it, the launch will not take place: only three, and three simultaneously. [passage omitted]

U.S. Sources on Nuclear Weapons Control Cited

LD0912173991 Moscow TASS in English
1401 GMT 9 Dec 91

[Text] Washington December 9 TASS—Representatives of the U.S. Administration, who wished to remain anonymous, said the United States preferred Soviet nuclear

weapons to be moved to the territory of Russia for safekeeping. "U.S. Secretary of State James Baker," they said, "may make this proposal during his forthcoming visits to Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine."

"This decision," they divulged, "was made after two-day debates, during which State Department sovietologists opposed the step, which they regarded as interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. However, Baker and White House staff members arrived at the unanimous conclusion that such a step was necessary in conditions when the Soviet Union was falling apart."

Canada 'Anxious' About Soviet Nuclear Arms

LD1012052991 Moscow TASS in English
2012 GMT 9 Dec 91

[By TASS correspondent Valentin Vasilets]

[Text] Ottawa December 9 TASS—Canada has taken a careful approach to the new commonwealth founded at a summit in Minsk on Sunday by Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia.

Canadian Foreign Ministry spokesman Scott Mallin told a Canadian press correspondent Foreign Ministry was closely watching the encouraging dialogue between the three Slav republics. "We shall see what comes next", Mallin said.

According to Mallin, as a member of NATO, Canada is anxious about the future of nuclear arms on their territory.

Observer Views Control of Nuclear Weapons

LD0912232191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 9 Dec 91

[Commentary by military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] The agreement the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine have signed to form a community of independent states has again called attention to who is going to possess the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. Here is an opinion from our military observer, Colonel Vadim Solovyev:

Nuclear weapons are deployed in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Until now the leaders of these four republics have repeatedly said nuclear weapons must remain in the hands of the center, but the decisions that were adopted in Minsk raise some questions. Significantly, the leaders of former Union republics agree that the sovereign states that have come into being on the territory of the former Soviet Union must by no means undermine international agreements on limiting weapons, the destructive nuclear weapons in the first place. This is in the interests of republics themselves. Besides, this can help establish good relations with neighboring countries and clear the way for entry into the international community. Mind you, as soon as

Ukraine proclaimed itself independent it stated full loyalty to the three non-nuclear principles not to have, not to import, and not to produce any nuclear weapons. Other republics are not pressing for the nuclear button, either.

On the other hand, in military and technical terms the common system of strategic nuclear weapons cannot be divided. If it is to continue functioning, it must be controlled by the center. No republic except for Russia, perhaps, can afford to maintain nuclear missiles, train personnel, let alone developing, testing or producing this kind of highly technological weapon.

A future for strategic nuclear weapons, among other questions, is discussed today by the State Council. The national president, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the presidents of the republics possessing nuclear weapons expect to adopt a final decision. On the meeting's eve, the Kazakh president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, said again that nuclear weapons had to remain under central control. It is certain all international commitments to reduce and get rid of nuclear weapons will be abided by, so will the unilateral strategic weapons initiative that President Gorbachev put forward last October.

Experts Comment on Nuclear Arsenal Security

*LD1112170791 Moscow TASS in English
1622 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[Text] Moscow December 11 TASS—The creation of a new commonwealth might make the Soviet nuclear arsenal more secure, military experts Vadim Makarenko and Dmitri Trenin told "THE NEW TIMES" weekly.

The Minsk agreement does not envisage a self-dissolution of the Armed Forces, it promotes only a change in the command structure, the experts claimed in today's issue of the weekly.

The Soviet president, as the commander of the Armed Forces, will be replaced by a coalition command of the three Slav republics. "One nuclear button will remain, but three fingers will be needed to press it", the experts said.

Makarenko and Trenin criticised the nuclear-free and neutrality principles of the Minsk agreement. "Neutrality of a certain republic is impossible in a commonwealth," they said.

The nuclear-free principle, evidently, means that the weapons will be gradually eliminated or withdrawn from the territories of the republics which do not want to have it, the experts explained. The latter variant means the Soviet nuclear arsenal will be deployed on Russian territory, they predicted.

The experts said this is a more civilised alternative which is likely to promote unity and preferable to the second alternative - to hand over control of nuclear arms to Russia.

Disintegration of Nuclear Power Viewed

*LD1112234491 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[Commentary by A. Gerasimov; introduced by correspondent Irina Mishina; from the "TV Inform" newscast]

[Text] [Mishina] For many years the downfall of the Soviet Union was an American dream. However, Robert Gates, the new director of the CIA, said on 10 December that this dream is turning into a nightmare. The biggest cause for concern for the Western strategists is the control of the 30,000 units of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

[Gerasimov] The text of the agreement on the creation of the commonwealth of independent Slav republics claims that the member-states of the commonwealth will preserve and maintain a common military-strategic space under a unified command including unified control over nuclear weapons. It does not clarify specifically by whom and how the nuclear button can be pressed.

This is the first time in human history that the disintegration of a nuclear power has occurred, and quite understandably the world's inhabitants are concerned over the question of guarantees of their strategic safety. Until 8 December the whole world was aware that only Mikhail Gorbachev could order the launching of the ICBMs located in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukraine.

Then on 9 December at a news conference on the results of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha meeting, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk stated that another system had been created for the launching of missiles and that three buttons, each under the control of the leaders of the Slav republics, needed to be pressed simultaneously. There was no mention of the fourth Kazakh button.

It is for military strategists and politicians to judge whether the security of the peoples of the former Soviet Union is increasing and whether world nuclear confrontation is decreasing, but those who have to eliminate the missiles are becoming dismayed. Refuting what the Ukrainian president had said, Gen. [General] Maksimov, the guardian of the missile potential, stated that both prior to and following Belovezhskaya Pushcha only the USSR president is in charge of the nuclear console. This was confirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in a telephone conversation with U.S. President George Bush.

Let us add that alongside the button with Gorbachev are the Defense Council and Defense Ministry of the Soviet Union, a state that to all intents and purposes no longer exists. In short it is a fine muddle in the best traditions of the USSR.

The out-of-favor Chief of the General Staff Lobov, who was recently sacked by the country's president, has brought further refinement to the situation. Today he expressed perplexity over his retirement and at the same

time stressed that his credo was the impossibility of the constantly changing political situation having an influence on the Armed Forces.

At present events are developing in such an unexpected way that it is virtually impossible to predict the future, and certainly it is essential to have precise guarantees from all leaders involved with nuclear weapons so that we do not feel like hostages of the button.

[Mishina] And so, up to the present moment Mikhail Gorbachev is the commander-in-chief of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. For the time being the politicians are waiting and assessing the situation. Meanwhile it has been learned that the United States, the EC and NATO have sent their representatives to the Ukraine to clarify the nuclear weapons situation on the spot.

Belarusan Defense Chief: No Hurry Over Nuclear Arms

*LD1112193391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1726 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk, 11 Dec (TASS)—“I think that we should not be in any hurry to hand over nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the republic to anybody,” Lieutenant General Petr Chausov told a session of the Supreme Soviet. Parliament today confirmed him as minister for defense affairs of the Republic of Belarus.

Petr Chausov, 52, was born in Gomel Oblast and educated at the Minsk “Suvorov” Academy. He served in Afghanistan. Until August of this year he was chief of staff of the Baltic Military District. In the last few months he has been USSR first deputy chief of civil defense.

According to the general, if nuclear warheads are kept on Belarus territory, it will not hinder the republic's gradual transition to the status of a neutral, nuclear-free power. A supporter of introducing a contractual system of army service, Petr Chausov proposes that the period of service should be cut to 18 months and that alternative service be introduced. He also wants an immediate and strict stocktaking of all military property located in Belarus and a tightening up of controls over the use of land by the military.

Kazakh Defense Official Favors Single Command

*LD1112144991 Moscow TASS in English
1440 GMT 11 Dec 91*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Yerlan Aktayev]

[Text] Alma-Ata December 11 TASS—“Kazakhstan does not need a nuclear button,” says Lieutenant-General Sagadat Nurmagambetov, chairman of the State Defense Committee of Kazakhstan.

In today's interview to the newspaper KAZAKHSTAN-SKAYA PRAVDA, he claims that Kazakhstan supports a single military-strategic space. Therefore strategic troops must be under a single collective command, with a single defense ministry and general staff.

The State Defense Committee will only occasionally monitor what is taking place in Army units located on the territory of the republic.

“At the same time Kazakhstan is against moving nuclear weapons,” Nurmagambetov said. “If we continue to live in a single military-strategic space, let everything remain as it is. Our republic will do everything to become a nuclear-free state, but it can attain that goal only through a negotiations involving all countries with nuclear capability.”

Air Force Chief Reassures Germans on Central Control

*AU1212112391 Hamburg DIE WELT
in German 12 Dec 91 p 3*

[Report by Ruediger Moniac: “All Commitments Regarding Germany Will Be Precisely Honored”]

[Excerpts] The current visit to Germany by the commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force is taking place against the backdrop of insecurity at home. This is the right time to ask him questions about his power, the commitments that the Soviet Union has assumed, and about nuclear weapons. Petr Deynekin answered these questions. News had just reached Bonn that President Gorbachev's resignation was to be expected soon. The senior official, who was paying a visit to Air Force Inspector Lieutenant General Kuebart at his Bonn office, took note of the news with a rigid face. It seems as though nothing could really move him any more in this troubled period.

Colonel General Petr Stepanovich Deynekin, a Russian who was born near Rostov in December 1937, is commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force and at the same time deputy defense minister of the Soviet Union. In Kuebart's presence he was asked whether, in view of the news from Moscow, he is certain that he is still in control of an “intact Soviet Air Force.” The Russian began his reply with a rhetorical ploy: “If one does not want to describe 20,000 Soviet pilots and 13,000 aircraft any longer as an Air Force, I would like to know what else I should describe as an Air Force.” “There are no signs that the Air Force no longer obeys parliament, the Defense Ministry, or me as the commander in chief,” he added calmly. [passage omitted]

Deynekin was naturally also asked about nuclear weapons in his country and about their control. He confirmed that the “long-distance flying forces”, the unit in which he advanced from the commander of Bear, Backfire and ultra modern Blackjack bombers to commander in chief, possess nuclear weapons within the framework of the nuclear “triad.” They are deployed in

the Russian Federation, but also in Belarus, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. "There is multiple control over the use of these weapons. In a final analysis, a joint decision must be made on the use of the weapons. A muddle-headed person cannot have sole control over the weapons. And to launch the weapons it is not enough for someone to press a button."

Asked whether he can guarantee the security of the nuclear weapons, he replied: "Yes, I guarantee control over the nuclear weapons at every level. I myself flew strategic nuclear carriers for 30 years, and I am quite familiar with this sphere. I am convinced that I enjoy authority among the major formations that are equipped with nuclear carriers." [passage omitted]

Nuclear Treaties To Apply to All Republics

*LD1212162391 Moscow TASS in English
1540 GMT 12 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—"The treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other multilateral international treaties and agreements of the Soviet Union, which applied to its entire territory, remain valid with regard to all republics that have ceased to be members of the union. This does not depend on whether they have reaffirmed their commitments under the treaties or not", the Soviet Committee for Constitutional Compliance stated in a resolution issued here on Thursday (12 December).

This decision was taken in view of the withdrawal of some republics from the USSR as well as a possible cessation of the existence of the union itself, a spokesman at the committee told TASS.

In this situation, a question arose about the validity of multilateral treaties, to which the USSR is a party, such as in particular the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and agreements on human rights, the spokesman explained.

Primakov Insists Nuclear Weapons 'Secure'

*LD1212204391 Moscow TASS in English
2019 GMT 12 Dec 91*

[By TASS correspondent Lori Cidylo]

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS—Yevgeniy Primakov, director of Soviet Central Intelligence, insisted at a luncheon for foreign correspondents in Moscow today that the system of control over the Soviet nuclear arsenal is secure and poses no threat to the world. Primakov said the mechanisms in place "absolutely guarantee" that nuclear weapons will not fall into the wrong hands. He emphasised the need to maintain a common military, economic, and central intelligence network among the republics of the former Soviet Union.

"We have to preserve in some form, I want to emphasise, in some form, a common economic space and military

strategic structure on the territory of the former Soviet Union...a common military structure is especially important for us as far as nuclear weapons are concerned and especially important for the world," Primakov said.

When asked about nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Primakov replied, "I think that they should be, and I am sure that they will be, under one command. When some people say that the presidents of various republics should all have access to the 'three buttons,' from the point of view of the country's defense, this is nonsense. There is no cause for worry," but when pressed for details about who is actually controlling the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal, Primakov was evasive. "Our experts met recently with American experts to discuss the problem, and they all agreed that our system is not less but more secure than anyone else's," he said, adding "this mechanism will remain in place, but who, concretely, is in charge of this, even if I knew it, I wouldn't tell you." As the Soviet Union unravels, no one can be certain that the old systems of control are still in place, or, if they are, how long they will remain so. The Bush administration is concerned that controls may break down completely amid the chaos gripping the country. Director of Central Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, said Tuesday [10 December], "we face a period of uncertainty as Russia and the other republics sort out possession of the weapons and establish new structures and procedures for controlling and operating them." Gates told the House Armed Services Committee, "the situation is dangerously unstable. The economy is in a free fall with no prospects for reversal in sight." Gates also spoke before Congress on Wednesday predicting severe social upheaval in the disintegrating Soviet Union, saying the country has not faced such turmoil since 1917, when Lenin and his Bolshevik Party, later to become the Communist Party, first rose to power. Robert Strauss, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, warned that in the current climate, a charismatic incendiary could easily gain power, and stoke the flames of nationalist sentiment, creating a situation which could escalate into civil war. CIA analysts worry that with no clear chain of command, a disgruntled army, suffering from shortages of food, fuel, and, in many cases, housing, could pose a threat to the fragile new commonwealth. Speaking of the fledgling leaders of the republics, Gates said, "We are deeply concerned that the enormous economic and social challenges...may overwhelm them."

Although Primakov predicted that "serious social tensions" could grip the Soviet Union by the beginning of next year due to the economic crisis, and particularly if reforms fail, he discounted the possibility of a second coup d'etat possibly by hard-line military forces, predicted by Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, and St. Petersburg Mayor, Anatoliy Sobchak. Tanks will not appear in the streets of Moscow again as they did last August, he said.

Primakov also said the commonwealth formed by Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, which has already been

ratified by the parliaments of those republics, has "positive implications," for the future, although he emphasized that a centralized intelligence network will continue to "serve the interests of society," in whatever form it emerges.

In an effort to stabilize the Soviet economic crisis, President Bush signed a law promoting trade relations with the Soviets on Tuesday.

Control of Nuclear Arms 'Not Clear' to West

PM1312104591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Dec 91 Union Edition p 4

[G. Deynichenko article: "It Is Not Clear to the World Which of Us Has His Finger on the Nuclear Button"]

[Text] The results of the meeting of the leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus in the Belovezhskaya Forest have probably only increased confusion in the West's main political centers. The spare wording of the foreign policy sections of the documents signed by the three leaders is too general to shed light on the future modus operandi of the Commonwealth as a whole and of each of its three members in the international arena.

The three leaders' decision "to preserve the united command of the common military-strategic space and unified control over nuclear weapons" is designed to be an important reassuring element of the "Belovezhskaya" documents. But our Western partners are not satisfied with this wording. They still are not clear on the question—one, it has to be said, that is most important to the peoples' security—of just what, nonetheless, is the fate of one of the largest nuclear arsenals on the planet.

Western capitals have seen, above all, a certain discrepancy in the participants' approaches to the problem of nuclear control. Whereas Yeltsin assured Bush that nuclear weapons will remain in one pair of hands, the Ukrainian president, on returning to Kiev after the meeting, spoke of a control system with three nuclear buttons, which are earmarked for the three leaders and must, in case of need, be pressed simultaneously. It is quite likely that there is no discrepancy here and that such trilateral control over nuclear weapons is called unified. But any ambiguity must be ruled out in such questions.

Meanwhile, the published documents do not reveal the three leaders' cooperation mechanism in the event—God forbid—of nuclear danger: whether this cooperation will be conducted through the united command, or whether this mechanism will insist on a safety device until the leaders themselves adopt a different decision.

But even if you remove this question, a fourth nuclear republic remains—Kazakhstan with its arsenal of nuclear systems, which, although small by the yardsticks of the former Soviet Union, is nonetheless weighty. How is it possible to speak of centralized control if Kazakhstan is at present outside the newly proclaimed Commonwealth? Finally, President Gorbachev, who nominally, according to the constitution, is commander in chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, is not giving up the nuclear button.

The agreement on the Commonwealth proclaims its members' desire to eliminate nuclear weapons and says that the sides "will respect each other's desire to achieve the status of a nuclear-free zone and a neutral state." These are noble aims which, understandably, are addressed to the future. But political experts believe—maybe without sufficient grounds—that it will not be that easy for the three Commonwealth member states to give up their nuclear status. Both because of prestige considerations and because of a secret wish to try to secure agreements advantageous to themselves because they will have the force of a nuclear wish. London's DAILY TELEGRAPH offers quite a sophisticated prognosis, yet one that is not devoid of probability. Citing the opinion of Western analysts, it maintains that "Yeltsin will hardly wish to destroy his strategic arsenal, mindful that China, which possesses nuclear weapons, is next door." Three other republics—the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—"also will not wish to disarm completely, fearing Yeltsin's monopoly in the nuclear arms sphere." It is worth adding that it is a matter not only of this: Kazakhstan has quite a long border with China.

I am sure that a certain part of all the suspicions, perplexities, and doubts being voiced in the West in connection with the destinies of the Soviet nuclear arsenals is simply farfetched. "There are no grounds for believing that Russia or the Ukraine are unreliable states," Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Sovietologist and member of the French Academy, firmly declares. There really are no grounds. And the presumption of innocence must exist in international law. But this does not free state leaders from the obligation to formulate the foreign policy goals and tasks of the newborn Commonwealth precisely and scrupulously, even if the birth caught them unawares.

Of course, with the passage of time, unless fickle fate intervenes in the further existence of the union of three states, their foreign policy declarations will become clear and orderly. Maybe it would make sense to wait before drawing conclusions, only nuclear arms cannot wait. What is needed to keep them in check is clear political power, which would close up the whole military chain from above. Such a structure cannot be seen in the "Belovezhskaya" documents.

GERMANY

Conditions Set for Destruction of Tanks Under CFE

AU1812165191 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Dec 91 p 4

[Article by Lt: "Destruction of Heavy Bundeswehr Equipment May Begin"]

[Text] Berlin, 17 December—The Bundeswehr has now created the conditions for the destruction of tanks and other heavy equipment that have to be scrapped under the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Agreement. A total of 14 firms have so far tried out the industrial destruction of tanks on individual vehicles. The last test exhibition of this kind took place on 17 December in Potsdam, in the presence of representatives of the Defense Ministry and officers of the Bundeswehr verification center, which monitors the compliance with arms control agreements. The destruction of larger numbers will begin only once the CFE Agreement is ratified by the parliaments of all participating countries. A Foreign Ministry official said in Potsdam on 17 December that after the USSR failed to respect the planned timetable for ratification, it is now hoped that the republics in the European part of the Soviet Union will ratify the agreement by spring.

Under the agreement, the Bundeswehr must reduce the number of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery by more than 10,000 units. According to Defense Ministry staff, this involves mainly equipment the Bundeswehr took over from the GDR National People's Army (NVA), although scrapping also includes more than 600 M-48 type tanks and more than 100 gun-equipped tank destroyers, which the Bundeswehr has so far used in the West. Part of the reduction is to be fulfilled by selling equipment to other states; on 17 December, Turkey and Finland were mentioned as buyers in Potsdam. The Federal Security Council is currently examining CSFR and Polish offers to buy equipment. According to estimates, it will be possible to sell one-fifth of the equipment at the most, while four-fifths or some 8,000 units have to be destroyed. The sales are expected to cover only a fragment of the estimated 260 million marks in destruction costs.

The Bundeswehr has provided individual tanks to all interested companies so they can study methods for disassembling them. Early next year a restricted call for tenders is to be made, asking the companies to specify at what price they would take over the disassembly of the equipment. It was said that the Bundeswehr's exploitation corporation will issue guidelines according to which harmful substances contained in the tanks have to be disposed of. The disposal of oils, hydraulic fluids, and varnish paints in a way that does not damage the environment accounts for an essential share of the cost of destruction, which is much higher than the value of the resulting steel scrap. Other methods of making the

equipment unusable, such as blasting the vehicles, have been discarded for environmental reasons, although they would have probably been cheaper. Experts are currently examining an offer to fill the tanks with concrete and use them as reinforcement for coastal protection structures.

According to the Bundeswehr, the disassembly of equipment from NVA stocks should exclusively take place in the new laender. Last year, even before German unification, the NVA disassembled several hundred T-55 tanks. The regulations under the CFE Agreement for the destruction of the equipment establish certain steps, which were demonstrated on a T-55 tank on the premises of the Maschinenbau Babelsberg company in Potsdam. The tank barrel as well as the breech of the gun must be cut in two; further cuts are compulsory on the turret, the chassis, and the drive unit. The Bundeswehr has meanwhile initiated the reduction of the large NVA ammunition stocks; this reduction is not included in the CFE Agreement.

Genscher Calls on NATO for 'Salvation' of CFE Treaty

AU2012142591 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Dec 91 pp 1-2

["fy." report: "NATO Wants To Employ Soldiers for Help for Soviet Union"]

[Excerpts] Brussels, 19 December—On 19 December, the deliberations of the NATO foreign ministers, who met for their autumn conference in Brussels, focused on the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the modalities and the extent of the necessary immediate help, and the development of relations with the successor states of the USSR. [passage omitted]

Genscher attached special importance to the "salvation" of the Vienna Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. However, its ratification by the Soviet parliament can no longer be expected. Therefore, efforts are planned for republics to accede to the treaty so that each of them will take over the total commitment that was undertaken by Moscow. Genscher proposed to the other NATO foreign ministers in Brussels to form a working group for the salvation of the CFE Treaty. All countries of the Cooperation Council should be represented in it. At a later date, the representatives of the new republics should join them. The EC criteria on respecting human and minority rights, the central control over all nuclear weapons, and the fulfillment of the CFE Treaty should be the standard for their recognition, he said.

Genscher Announces Deposition of CFE Ratification Document

LD2312140991 Berlin ADN in German 1323 GMT
23 Dec 91

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Today the Federal Government handed over the German ratification document on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

to the Dutch depositary, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party) [FDP] announced in Bonn. It has thus made its contribution to the implementation of the treaty, "which remains of decisive importance for stability and security in Europe, in particular in Eastern Europe." Genscher said the CFE treaty will come into force when all the 22 treaty signatory states have deposited the ratification documents. So far, it has been ratified by the Central and East European states—apart from Romania and the Soviet Union—and by the major Western countries. Genscher said the United States will deposit its ratification document this year.

Genscher said that with its far-reaching stipulations on arms reduction, ceilings, and comprehensive verification regime, the treaty establishes the foundation for overcoming the four decades of military confrontation in Europe and forms the basis for expanding a new cooperative security order in Europe.

The treaty places an obligation particularly on the Soviet Union to make far-reaching reductions in its conventional weapons. But for the Federal Republic, too, it "means substantial reduction obligations, amounting to roughly the size of the weapons taken over from the former GDR National People's Army," Genscher said.

Soviet Army Forces Fulfill 1991 Withdrawal Plan
*LD2712170891 Hamburg DPA in German 1502 GMT
27 Dec 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, the commander in chief of the former USSR's Western Group of Forces, this group, which is stationed on German territory, has "fulfilled by 100 percent" the 1991 withdrawal schedule. In an article in tomorrow's edition of the daily newspaper DIE WELT, Burlakov writes that a total of 165,000 persons (this figure probably also includes civilians) were withdrawn and 58 bases vacated. In the coming year the troops would be leaving barracks and military installations in Dresden, Leipzig, Naumburg, Jena, Weimar, Perleberg, Ludwigslust, Hagenow, and other towns.

Regarding the troop withdrawal, Burlakov notes that many of the soldiers leaving Germany cannot find housing back home. Burlakov appealed to the governments to introduce more effective measures for housing construction on the territory of the former Union for the 7.8 billion German marks [DM] that had been made available. Experts would assess the value of the property of the Western Group in the former GDR at DM10.5 billion. Burlakov suggested that the Federal Ministry of Finance come up with a figure for the value of the property. "All the money realized" should be used first of all for the construction of housing for the soldiers' families.

An edited version of the article was handed to DPA.

UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Office Aide Warns NATO on Soviet Missiles

*LD1912150191 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1419 GMT 19 Dec 91*

[By Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] The delicate task of ensuring stable nuclear control in the crumbling Soviet Union involves "very serious risks," Foreign Office Minister Douglas Hogg warned today. Mr. Hogg told NATO talks in Brussels that the West faced a grave problem with no easy or short term solutions. But he warned the allies not to become too obsessed by the issue of nuclear control. "We must keep our eye on chemical and biological weapons too," he told the alliance's foreign ministers.

They were gathered to hear an account from American Secretary of State James Baker of his visit to the Soviet Union to assess the stability of the emerging republics and the scope for Western humanitarian aid and expertise in the handling of nuclear arsenals.

NATO is likely to play a key role in sending 140 million pounds sterling worth of food aid agreed by the European Community earlier this week. Mr. Baker said NATO's unique expertise and co-ordinating role in what was now a "real and urgent crisis" should be used to make the most of national efforts.

But the allies are realistic on the West's involvement in nuclear weapons control. While some Soviet republics have already acknowledged they will need outside advice, there is no suggestion that NATO governments will get close to the heart of the Soviet nuclear weapons machine.

German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said it was crucial to avoid a power vacuum. Recognising the new Soviet republics' independence should be linked in some way to dismantling nuclear weapons. He and Mr. Hogg warned that the latest agreements on reductions in conventional weapons, signed but not ratified, must not be lost in the break-up of the Soviet bloc.

Arriving for the talks, Mr. Baker said he was reassured by his meetings in Moscow and the various republics. But NATO was facing challenges in helping with the smooth transfer of power. This afternoon the ministers were continuing talks on logistical help with humanitarian aid and assessing priorities and distribution. Britain is already contributing 20 million pounds sterling worth of animal feed, particularly in the north-west of the Soviet Union.

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